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Abstract 
The current project aimed to explore lower and higher order phenomena of self-awareness 
in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). According to some theoretical approaches (e.g. the 
alexithymia hypothesis), ASD is characterised by impaired interoceptive accuracy. That is 
the ability to form first order representations of the physiological conditions of the body 
and thus to detect body signals. It has also been claimed that both mindreading (ability to 
attribute mental states to others) and metacognitive monitoring (ability to attribute mental 
states to one’s own self) are diminished in ASD because a deficit in the ability to form 
metarepresentations lies at the heart of this disorder. Nonetheless, the study of lower and 
higher order phenomena of self-awareness in ASD is limited and the existing findings 
conflicting. As such, we conducted five experiments aiming to investigate interoception 
and metacognitive monitoring in ASD. In Experiment 1.1, we found strong evidence that 
interoceptive accuracy is undiminished in ASD, exploring both cardiac and respiratory 
domains and moderate evidence for diminished interoceptive awareness. Despite finding in 
Experiment 2.1 that autism traits were unrelated to peoples’ ability to impute mental states 
to themselves, in Experiment 2.2, we found that implicit, but not explicit metacognitive 
monitoring abilities were diminished among individuals with ASD. In Experiment 3.1, we 
also found that autism traits were unrelated to metacognitive monitoring in the general 
population, as indexed by accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty. In line with 
that, we did not find evidence that this ability was diminished among people with a full 
diagnosis of ASD (Experiment 3.2). In sum, the current project provides strong evidence 
for intact lower order phenomena of self-awareness in ASD and tentative evidence for 
impaired higher order phenomena. Replication awaits before strong conclusions can be 
drawn. 
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Lower and High Order Phenomena of Self-Awareness in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
“Self” describes “the particular being any person is, whatever it is about each of us 
that distinguishes you or me from others, draws the parts of our existence together, persists 
through changes, or opens the way to becoming who we might or should be” (Seigel, 2007, 
p.3). This definition leads us to think that “self” is a non-unitary construct.  
Indeed, the multidimensional nature of “self” has been proposed since the period of 
Renaissance, and to date it remains a generally acknowledged notion (Lewis, 1995; Lind, 
2010; Neisser, 1988; Rochat, 2003; Seigel, 2007; Williams, 2010). The philosophical 
movement towards accepting the existence of many “selves”, rather than a single one led 
to the diffusion of a plethora of taxonomies that made the systematic exploration of “self” 
a feasible accomplishment (Neisser, 1988). Two salient and particularly important 
distinctions are those between the “I” and “me” self (James, 1890) and between the 
“physical” and “psychological” self (Gillihan & Farah, 2005). 
 “I” self-awareness occurs when an individual experiences themselves as the 
subject of a particular experience (Butterworth, 1995; James 1890). Whereas, “m ” elf-
awareness, the “mysterious operation”, as it has been characterised by James (1890) is 
ascribed to a person that recognises themselves as the object of their own 
cognition/perception (Butterworth, 1995; James, 1890; Lind, 2010). “Physical” self-
awareness entails a sense of body ownership that extends from its outward phenotype to its 
internal functions (Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Whereas, “psychological” self-awareness 
involves the sense of an inner psychological world that comprises traits, emotions, 
memories, and so on (Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Two different mechanisms underlie these 
dimensions of self-awareness. That is the capacity to form first order representations and 
the ability to form metarepresentations (or else second order representations).  
On one hand, first order representations are internal mental representations of the 
world, including the “self”, which have been constructed in absolute consistence with the 
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external reality (Dretske, 1995; Leslie, 1987). It is the ability to form fist order 
representations that enables individuals of get an awareness of their very basic dimensions 
and functions of self, namely lower order phenomena of self-awareness. Interoception has 
been defined as one of the lower order phenomena of self-awareness (Craig, 2009; 
Damasio, 2000; Lind & Bowler, 2008; Seth, 2013). On the other hand, metarepresentations 
are the representations of the first order representations (Carruthers, 2009; Leslie 1987; 
Pylyshyn, 1978) and as such enable individuals to get an awareness of more complex and 
delicate dimensions of self, namely higher order phenomena (Asendorpf, Warkentin, & 
Baudonnière, 1996; Carruthers, 2008; Lind & Bowler, 2008; Perner, 1991; Suddendorf & 
Whiten, 2001). Metarepresentational abilities have been considered the epitome of 
metacognition, and thus this concept has been used as index of higher order phenomena of 
self-awareness (Carruthers, 2008; 2009). 
Interoception 
Interoception was originally described as any reaction of sensory nerve receptors 
triggered by visceral stimuli (Fowler, 2003; Sherrington, 1906), but now this narrow 
definition has been broadened into any “sense of the physiological conditions of the body” 
(Craig, 2003, p. 500). A key element of interoception is that these signals can become 
conscious and thus facilitate the regulation of peoples’ behaviour accordingly (Cameron, 
2002). Whilst, the contemporary definition refers to a broad range of signals, research has 
predominantly focused on signals from the heart (Schandry, 1981).  
The heartbeat tracking task is one of the most classic and widely used paradigms 
employed to measure cardiac interoceptive accuracy (Critchley, Wiens, Rothstein, 
Öhlman, & Dolan, 2004; Herbert, Pollatos, & Schandry, 2007; Herbert, Ulbrich, & 
Schandry, 2007; Pollatos, Gramann, & Schandry, 2007; Schandry, 1981; Shah, Hall, 
Catmur, & Bird, 2016; Wiens, 2005). In this task, participants are asked to estimate the 
number of their heartbeats, during a given period, without touching any part of their body 
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(hence “from the inside”), while an objective measure of heart rate is taken (e.g., using a 
finger pulse oximeter or ECG recordings). The degree of correspondence between the 
objective and the subjective heartbeat estimation provides an index of interoceptive 
accuracy. Despite the objective nature of the heartbeat tracking task, some potential 
limitations have been reported. It has been argued that this measure is unable to detect 
individual differences at the lower levels of interoceptive accuracy (Khalsa, Rudrauf, 
Damasio, Davidson, Lutz, Tranel, & 2008; Murphy et al., 2018) but most importantly, it 
has been reported that individuals could achieve an accurate heartbeat estimation by 
perceiving vibrations from the reflection of the heartbeats on parts of their bodies (Khalsa, 
Rudraufl, Feinstein, & Tranel, 2009, Murphy et al., 2018). Therefore, other organs, 
including the lungs have started gaining more attention in the field of interoception 
(Daubenmier, Sze, Kerr, Kemeny, & Mehling, 2013; Faull, Cox, & Pattinson, 2016).  
Respiratory interoceptive accuracy has been mainly measured with different types 
of resistive load tasks (Bogaerts et al., 2008; Daubenmier, Sze, Kerr, Kemeny, & Mehlin, 
2013; Garfinkel et al., 2016a). However, these kind of tasks cannot be considered the most 
appropriate one for testing clinical populations, given their invasive nature. In a recently 
published study, Murphy, Catmur, and Bird (2018a) employed a blow task and measured 
individuals’ ability to exert control over exhaling, as index of respiratory interoceptive 
accuracy. Nevertheless, interoception is a multidimensional construct, and as such, it does 
not include only accuracy. Interoceptive awareness is another facet of interoception, which 
is distinct from interoceptive accuracy (Ceunen, Van Diest, & Vlaeyen, 2013; Forkmann, 
et al., 2016; Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015). 
Interoceptive awareness concerns the accuracy of one’s judgements of the degree 
of correspondence between estimates of interoceptive accuracy and actual accuracy 
(Forkmann et al., 2016; Garfinkel et al., 2015, 2016b). In more simple terms, it refers to 
“metacognitive awareness of objective accuracy” (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013, p. 233), 
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and as such, it involves forming metarepresentations of one’s own beliefs about their 
ability to judge their own physical internal states (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013). The higher 
the accuracy of judgements of interoceptive accuracy the better the metacognitive 
awareness. This ability has been assessed with the addition of judgment of confidence 
tasks in traditional paradigms (e.g. heartbeat tracking task, heartbeat discrimination task) 
that measure interoceptive accuracy (Ehlers, Breuer, Dohn, & Fiegenbaum, 1995; 
Garfinkel et al., 2015; Khalsa et al., 2008).  
Metacognition 
Metacognition describes “any knowledge or cognitive activity that takes as its 
cognitive object, or regulates, any aspect of any cognitive activity” (Flavell, Miller, & 
Miller, 1993, p.150). In simple terms, it is the cognition about cognition. That is to say, 
people’s ability to form thoughts about their own thoughts and cognition (Dunlosky & 
Metcalfe, 2009; Flavell, 1979). Metacognition has been considered multifaceted. One of its 
most widely acknowledged dimensions is the awareness of a current mental state or 
cognitive process. Namely, metacognitive monitoring (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009).  
Metacognitive monitoring is a powerful cognitive tool that is involved in various aspects of 
human life.  
Individuals’ behaviour in everyday situations is much affected by this ability, as it 
is the awareness of ones’ own current mental states that allows the regulation of those 
states (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). Moreover, it has been found that metacognitive 
monitoring predicts educational achievement independent of IQ (Hartwig & Dunlosky, 
2012; Pishghadam & Khajavy, 2013; Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault, 1999; Veenman & 
Spaans, 2005), with its predictive effect being especially strong for performance in 
mathematics (Higgins et al., 2013; Iuculano et al., 2014). In addition, cognitive deficits and 
difficulties in mathematics can be alleviated through training in metacognitive strategies 
(Dunlosky, Kubat-Silman, & Hertzog, 2003; Maras, Gamble, & Brosnan, 2017; Murphy, 
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Schmitt, Caruso, & Sanders, 1987; Roebers, Cimeli, Röthlisberger, & Neuenschwander, 
2012; Roebers, Krebs, & Roderer, 2014; Teong, 2003).  
Metacognitive monitoring entails different metacognitive experiences that reflect 
the conscious cognitive or affective experience that follows a cognitive process, including 
judgements of confidence and metacognitive experiences of difficulty (Dunlosky & 
Metcalfe, 2009; Efklides, 2006; Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1994; Schneider, 2008). 
These experiences enable us to operationalise metacognitive monitoring and thus to 
measure this ability.  
Judgement of confidence (JoC) is one of the classic tasks that have been used to 
investigate metacognitive monitoring (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Koriat, 2007). At first, 
individuals take a test (e.g. memory or visual discrimination), and then they are asked to 
indicate their confidence about the correctness of each of the previously given responses. 
The correspondence between the object-level test performance and the meta-level 
judgements of confidence provides an index of metacognitive monitoring. The higher the 
correspondence the better the ability (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009).  
Metacognitive experiences of difficulty have been explored with a masked priming 
experiment (Desender, Van Opstal, Hughes, & Van den Bussche, 2016). In this task, an 
invisible prime arrow and a target one are presented, almost simultaneously to individuals 
who are instructed to respond to the direction of the target arrow. On congruent trials, the 
prime arrow has the same direction with the target one, and thus individuals tend to 
provide fast and correct responses to the target arrow. Whereas, on incongruent trials, the 
stimuli have different directions, creating a response conflict that make individuals give 
slower and prone to error responses (Desender, Van Opstal, Hughes, & Van den Bussche, 
2014). After each response, individuals are asked to judge the difficulty they experienced 
when responding to the target arrow, without being aware of which trials were 
experimentally manipulated to be more difficult (incongruent trials), compared to the other 
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ones (congruent trials) (Desender et al., 2016). The more the subjective experience of 
difficulty coincides with the actual difficulty of the trial, the better the metacognitive 
monitoring ability. When Desender et al. (2016) employed this task among neurotypical 
people, they found that people were indeed able to give accurate metacognitive 
judgements, labelling incongruent trials as “rather more difficult” and congruent ones as 
“rather less difficult”.   
Regardless of the different ways that “self” has been operationalised, the 
importance of self-awareness is indisputable; besides “we are what our attention to 
ourselves makes us be” (Seigel, 2005, p.6). This makes the exploration of self-awareness 
even more crucial for disorders that are inherently related with this concept, when it comes 
to their understanding (Kerig, Ludlow, & Wenar, 2012). One of the most prominent ones is 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (autism = “autos” = self). 
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder that affects 
approximately 1% of the childhood population in the UK (Baird et al., 2006; Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2009). The prognosis of ASD is poor, with the majority of affected individuals 
dependent on families and social services, socially excluded and unemployed (Howlin, 
Goode, Hutton, & Rutter, 2004).  
Individuals are diagnosed with ASD based on a constellation of significant social-
communication difficulties, together with restricted interests and repetitive behaviours 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This “dyad” of impairments is reflected upon 
the clinical manifestation of the disorder. That is to say, difficulties in social-emotional 
reciprocity, absence or idiosyncratic verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviour, 
deficits in social relationships, insistence on sameness and on stereotyped behaviours, 
highly restricted interests, and sensory peculiarities (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013).  
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These difficulties have been proposed to be part of  a “broad autism phenotype” 
(Bolton et al., 1994; Goldberg et al., 2005; Le Couteur et al., 1996; Murphy et al., 2000; 
Pickles et al., 2000; Piven et al., 1997; Szatmari et al., 2000). That is to say, there are 
personality characteristics in the neurotypical population that are qualitatively similar to 
the defining features of ASD, reflecting the phenotypic expression of the disorder, 
henceforth autism traits.  Research findings have indicated that autism traits are normally 
distributed in the general population (Constantino & Todd, 2000; 2003; Ronald, Happé, 
Price, Baron-Cohen, & Plomin, 2006) but most importantly that “unaffected” relatives of 
people with ASD have increased autism traits compared to the general population (Frazier 
et al., 2014; Pickles et al., 2000; Piven et al., 1994; 1997). As such, it has been suggested 
that the study of the relation between individual differences in autism traits and 
psychological concepts among people form the general population could be informative 
about the ASD itself (Williams, Nicholson, & Grainger, 2018a).  
According to one well-documented hypothesis, the social-communication 
difficulties that characterise individuals with ASD could be partially attributed to impaired 
mindreading abilities (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014; Frith, 1994; Tager-Flusberg, 1999). 
Mindreading (often called “theory of mind”) is the ability to represent people’s thoughts. 
In our everyday life, we constantly (and often unconsciously) attribute mental states, such 
as beliefs, desires, intentions, goals, and feelings to other individuals in an attempt to 
interpret, predict, and explain their behaviour (Carruthers, 2009; Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) were the first who provided evidence for 
impaired mindreading abilities in children with ASD. Since then, many researchers have 
successfully replicated these findings, examining both children and adults with ASD 
(Baron‐Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001a; Senju, Southgate,White, & 
Frith, 2009; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998). 
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Despite the wealth of studies on social-communication difficulties in ASD, the 
second half of the “dyad” of impairments remains relatively under-researched. Although, it 
has been suggested that many of the unexplained clinical manifestations of ASD, such as 
repetitive behaviours and absence of pretend play could be attributed to diminished self-
awareness (Carruthers, 1996; Frith & Happé, 1999; Hobson, 1990), the study of lower and 
higher order phenomena of self-awareness in ASD has only recently began.  
Interoception and ASD. 
Recent studies have shown that interoceptive accuracy plays a major role in 
important psychological functions, including emotion-processing, empathy and 
mindreading, on the basis that emotions are triggered from the perception and 
interpretation of physiological changes (Craig, 2003; Damasio, 2000; Garfinkel et al., 
2015; Shah, Catmur, & Bird, 2017; Terasawa, Moriguchi, Tochizawa, & Umeda, 2014). 
As such, individuals with high interoceptive abilities tend to experience their emotions 
more intensely (Herbert et al., 2007; Wiens, Mezzacappa, & Katkin, 2000) and thus to 
understand them better (Critchley, 2005; Herbert , Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011). Based on 
this assumption, diminished interoception can have potentially serious implications in 
disorders that are characterised by deficits in those abilities, such as ASD (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Blair, 2008; Philip et al., 2010).  
Quattrocki and Friston (2014) argued that the cause of ASD is a profoundly 
damaged oxytocin system. Oxytocin is a hormone that acts as a neurotransmitter in the 
brain and plays an important role in sexual reproduction and regulation of related social 
behaviours. According to the “oxytocin hypothesis”, a dysfunctional oxytocin system 
mediates the relationship between interoception and social cognition. In the case of ASD, 
that dysfunctional system transfers diminished interoceptive signals to the affected 
individual, resulting in a reduced capacity to represent cognitive/emotional states in others 
(Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). Brewer, Happé, Cook, and Bird (2015), criticising this 
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account claimed that it is not autism per se that is characterised by diminished 
interoception. Instead, the co-occurrence with ASD alexithymia results in interoceptive 
deficits.  
Alexithymia affects 50% of individuals with ASD (Berthoz & Hill, 2005) and 
describes a difficulty in identifying and describing emotions, as well as in distinguishing 
feelings from body sensations (Nemiah, Freyberger, & Sifneos, 1976; Sifneos, 1973). 
According to the “alexithymia hypothesis”, some of the social and emotional difficulties in 
ASD are explained by the co-occurrence of alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013; Bird et al., 
2010; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013; Oakley, Brewer, Bird & Catmur, 2016). In line 
with this hypothesis, it has been suggested that interoception too has a unique relation to 
alexithymia and thus individuals with ASD have impaired interoception only when 
alexithymia co-occurs with ASD (Brewer, Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2015; Hatfield, Brown, 
Giummarra & Leggenhager, 2017; Herbert et al., 2011; Shah, et al., 2016). The prediction 
that follows both theoretical accounts is that affected individuals with ASD have impaired 
interoceptive accuracy, either as a core feature of ASD or as one of the consequences of 
alexithymia.   
The counter argument that interoceptive accuracy is intact in ASD stems from the 
theoretical claim that there is a distinction between physical and psychological self 
(Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Based on findings that people with ASD have intact body 
recognition when they reach an appropriate developmental level (Dawson & McKissick, 
1984; Lind & Bowler, 2009; Nielsen, Suddendorf, & Dissanayake, 2006) as well as 
unimpaired recognition of their own agency (Frith & Hermelin, 1969; Williams & Happé, 
2009), it has been argued that physical self-awareness is intact in ASD (Williams, 2010). 
Given that interoceptive accuracy lies under the sphere of physical self-awareness, it has 
been suggested that is undiminished in ASD as well (Lind, 2010; Nicholson et al., 2018, 
Uddin , 2011; Williams, 2010).  
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Metacognition and ASD. 
Whilst a consensus regarding metacognition in ASD could have direct impact on 
affected individuals’ everyday life and education, it remains controversial whether ASD is 
characterised by impaired or intact metacognition. “One-system” theorists claim that 
metacognition is impaired in ASD, on the basis that individuals become aware of 
themselves with the same way they become aware of others (Carruthers, 2009; Gopnik, 
1993; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994; Hobson, 1990).  
Carruthers, who is one of the main proponents of this account, argues in favour of a 
single metarepresentational faculty (Carruthers, 2009; Leslie, 1987; Moore & Frye, 1991) 
that enables individuals to be aware of themselves, simply by turning the human capacity 
of attributing mental states to others to their own selves. This faculty was initially 
developed to serve the purpose of reading other people’s mind, so that human beings could 
increase their chances of survival (Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2004). Yet, during the course of 
evolution, this role became dual with individuals using metarepresentational abilities in 
order to read their own minds as well (Carruthers, 2009; 2011; 2013). Subsequently, 
mindreading and metacognition are inherently related and thus, a double dissociation 
between them could never be the case (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 2006). Given that is well- 
established that people with ASD have attenuated mindreading abilities (Baron‐Cohen et 
al., 2001a; Senju et al., 2009; Yirmiya et al., 1998), “one-system” theorists predict that 
individuals with ASD have profound difficulties also in metacognition (Caruthers, 2009; 
Gopnik, 1993; Williams, 2010).  
In contrast, “two-system” theorists postulate that mindreading and metacognition 
are two independent capacities based on either entirely different or partly different 
underlying cognitive mechanisms (Couchman, Coutinho, Beran, & Smith, 2009; Goldman, 
2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003). As such, they predict that people with ASD have diminished 
mindreading abilities but intact metacognition (Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003). 
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According to “two-system” theorists, autobiographical accounts indicate that individuals 
with ASD are able to reflect upon their mental states and discuss about them, providing 
evidence for undiminished metacognitive abilities in ASD (Nichols & Stich, 2003; 
McGeer, 2004; but see Williams, 2010). To date, the theoretical dispute between “one-
system” theorists and “two-system” theorists remains unresolved.  
The Current Project  
In the current project, we conducted five experiments aiming to provide insight on 
lower and higher order phenomena of self-awareness in ASD (see Appendix A for 
Experiment 4.1). In Experiment 1.1, we conducted a case-control study in order to explore 
interoceptive accuracy and interoceptive awareness, within two different interoceptive 
domains. In Experiment 2.1 and 2.2, we investigated ccuracy of implicit and explicit 
judgments of confidence not only among people with a full diagnosis of ASD but also in 
relation to autism traits, as measured in the general population. Finally, in Experiment 3.1 
and 3.2, we explored accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty following the 
approach described above. That is a novel methodology that is gaining increasing attention 
in the study of ASD (Nicholson et al., 2018; Williams, Bergstrom, & Grainger, 2016; 
Williams et al., 2018a; Williams, Nicholson, Grainger, Lind, & Carruthers, 2018b).  
 Based on the hypothesis of a “broad autism phenotype”, it has been argued that the 
relation between cognitive phenomena of interest and autism traits could inform 
predictions about between-group differences in case-control studies (Williams et al., 2016). 
However, it has been also claimed that measuring autism traits is not always a valid proxy 
for deficits in ASD, because qualitative differences in cognitive mechanisms could 
differentiate people with and without a diagnosis of ASD (Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 
2005; Ruzich et al., 2015). Therefore, conducting both types of experiments appears to 
provide a better understanding of the phenomena under investigation (Williams et al., 
2018b).  
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1. Exploring Interoception in ASD 
As noted in the general introduction, there is a suggestion that ASD is characterised 
by attenuated interoceptive abilities, either due to a dysfunctional oxytocin system 
(Quattrocki & Friston, 2014) or as one of the consequences of alexithymia (Brewer et al., 
2015) that affects almost half of the individuals with ASD (Berthoz & Hill, 2005). 
Alternatively, it has been argued that interoceptive accuracy is undiminished among 
individuals with ASD, as it reflects their intact physical self-awareness (e.g. Nicholson et 
al., 2018; Williams, 2010). Regardless of the contradictory predictions that stem from 
these theoretical accounts, all of them raise the importance of examining interoception 
when it comes to the understanding of ASD. Nonetheless, to date research evidence is 
surprisingly sparse, with only four studies having examined cardiac interoceptive accuracy 
employing the heartbeat tracking task among adults with ASD and with only one study 
having focused on respiratory interoceptive domain. Despite the clear hypotheses that stem 
from the theoretical accounts described above, we cannot draw firm conclusions about 
interoceptive accuracy in ASD because the existing research findings are to a great extent 
contradictory.  
Garfinkel et al. (2016b) tested 20 adults with ASD and 20 comparison participants, 
matched for gender and age, using the heartbeat tracking task. They found that the ASD 
group showed significantly lower interoceptive accuracy, compared to the control group, 
and thus they concluded that interoceptive abilities are attenuated in ASD. However, 
Garfinkel et al. (2016b) did not measure IQ, which has been found to be positively 
associated with interoceptive accuracy (Mash, Schauder, Cochran, Park, & Cascio, 2017; 
Murphy et al., 2018c). Therefore, it is unclear whether their results reflect a genuine trough 
in ASD or have been confounded by the effect of IQ.  
When Shah, Hall, Catmur, and Bird (2016) tested 19 adults with ASD and 19 
comparisons matched for age, gender, IQ, and alexithymia, they did not find significant 
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between-group differences in interoceptive accuracy. Nonetheless, they concluded that this 
was the case only because groups were matched for alexithymia, implying that differences 
would be apparent if participants with ASD had elevated levels of alexithymia.  
Nicholson et al. (2018) refuted this hypothesis by testing 46 adults with ASD and 
46 comparison participants, closely matched for age, gender, and IQ and finding that a 
“high alexithymic” ASD group did not differ significantly from a “low alexithymic” group 
in interoceptive accuracy. Moreover, their complete ASD group showed interoceptive 
accuracy equivalent with the comparison group, reflecting an intact ability in ASD. Yet, 
even these results should be interpreted with caution because Nicholson and his colleagues 
(2018) did not control for the effect of body mass index (BMI), which has been found to be 
negatively associated with interoceptive accuracy (Murphy, Geary, Millgate, Catmur, & 
Bird, 2018b; Rouse, Jones, & Jones, 1988). Thus, if their control group had greater BMI, 
compared to the ASD group, then potential between-group differences in interoceptive 
accuracy may have been obscured.  
Indeed, when Mul, Stagg, Herbelin, and Aspell (2018) controlled for BMI, they 
found significant between-group differences in interoceptive accuracy that led them to 
conclude that this ability is attenuated among people with ASD. Nonetheless, they did not 
measure either verbal or performance IQ. Groups were only equated for their full scale IQ, 
which does not exclude the possibly that diminished interoceptive accuracy in the ASD 
group might be due to the confound effect of between-group differences in either verbal or 
performance IQ (Mash et al., 2017; Murphy et al., 2018c).  
Murphy et al. (2018a) examined interoceptive accuracy within the respiratory 
domain, employing a blow task among people from the general population and measuring 
their autism traits. In this novel task, participants were asked to blow into a peak flow 
meter and then to exhale for a second time, aiming to target a particular percent of the 
intensity of their first exhalation. Murphy et al. (2018a) found that autism traits were not 
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significantly associated with respiratory interoceptive accuracy and based on that they 
concluded that it is questionable whether individuals with a diagnosis of ASD have 
diminished respiratory interoceptive abilities. Nonetheless, to date this has never been 
explored.  
 Research evidence is also sparse with respect to interoceptive awareness. To our 
knowledge, only two studies have examined this metacognitive phenomenon among 
individuals with ASD, and yet the heartbeat tracking task has not been used in either of 
them. Instead, Garfinkel et al. (2016b) used a heartbeat discrimination task, in which 
participants had to judge whether a tone was synchronous or asynchronous to their heart 
rate. Following this task, participants’ judgements of confidence were elicited. Their 
analysis revealed no significant between-group differences in interoceptive awareness. 
However, it remains unclear whether confidence judgments were predictive of 
interoceptive accuracy in both groups or in any of them, and whether interoceptive 
awareness was above or below chance level. Palser, Fotopoulou, Pellicano, and Kilner 
(2018) employed the same task among children with ASD and neurotypical children, and 
found that children with ASD were more confident about their interoceptive accuracy, 
compared to neurotypical children. Nonetheless, this study is uninformative about 
interoceptive awareness in ASD because judgments of confidence were analysed 
independently of partic pants’ interoceptive accuracy.  
Overall, it may not be possible to draw strong conclusions from studies measuring 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy and awareness alone among individuals with ASD, given 
conflicting findings and possible methodological limitations. Nonetheless, there is an 
almost complete absence of studies in ASD focusing on other interoceptive domains, 
making the relation between interception and ASD even more nebulous. 
Given that it has already been found a non-significant association between autism 
traits and either cardiac or respiratory interoceptive accuracy in the general population 
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(Murphy, Catmur, & Bird, 2018a, Nicholson et al., 2018), we conducted only a case-
control study among people with a full diagnosis of ASD and neurotypical people. The aim 
of the current experiment was to examine two different interoceptive domains in ASD, 
overcoming some of the limitations of previous research, such controlling for the potential 
confound effects of depressive symptoms and anxiety on interoceptive accuracy (Garfinkel 
et al., 2016; Pollatos, Traut‐Mattausch, & Schandry).  
Experiment 1.1: Case-Control 
In Experiment 1.1, we explored cardiac and respiratory interoceptive accuracy, 
using the classic heartbeat tracking task (Schandry, 1981) and a slightly modified version 
of Murphy et al.’s (2018a) blow task, controlling for the effect of a series of potential 
confounds. In both tasks, participants’ judgments of confidence were elicited in order to 
measure cardiac and respiratory interoceptive awareness. In addition, participants 
completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin, and Clubley, 2001b), the 20-Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Parker, 
Taylor, & Bagby, 1994), the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RMIE; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001a), and the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 
2006), with the last two measuring mindreading abilities.  
As it is well-established that individuals with ASD have significant deficits in 
attributing mental states to others (e.g. Yirmiya, et al., 1998), our first predictions was that 
participants with ASD would show diminished performance in both mindreading tasks, 
compared to neurotypical participants. Second, we predicted that we would find no 
significant between-group differences, in either cardiac or respiratory interoceptive 
accuracy. This prediction was based on the theoretical claim th t interoceptive accuracy 
entails first order representations of body signals and as such is undiminished in ASD, 
reflecting intact physical self -awareness (e.g. Damasio, 2000; Williams, 2010). Also based 
on that, we did not expect significant differences in interoceptive accuracy, even when 
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contrasting ASD participants with low alexithymia with ASD participants with high 
alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013). Despite predicting undiminished accuracy, we expected 
that participants with ASD would show atypical cardiac and respiratory interoceptive 
awareness, based on the claim that both mindreading and metacognition are under the 
umbrella of a single metarepresentational faculty (e.g. Carruthers, 2009). Finally, we 
aimed to establish the extent to which interoceptive awareness is associated with 
mindreading abilities. Previous findings have indicated a positive association between 
metacognition, as indexed by judgements of confidence accuracy and mindreading abilities 
(Williams et al., 2016), but to date no study has examined the association between 
interoceptive awareness and mindreading. Based on “one-system” theory (e.g. Carruthers, 
2009) and on the suggestion that interoceptive awareness is metarepresentational (e.g. 
Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013), we expected to find a positive and significant association 
between interoceptive awareness and mindreading.  
Experiment 1.1: Method 
Participants  
Twenty-two adults with ASD and 20 neurotypical comparison adults participated in 
the current experiment after they had given written informed consent. All participants with 
ASD had received formal diagnoses, according to established criteria (DSM-IV-TR, 
American Psychiatric Association 2000; ICD-10, World Health Organisation 1993). In 
addition, participants with ASD completed the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS; Lord et al., 2000), a widely used semi-structured observational measure that 
provides an accurate diagnosis of autism and symptom severity.1 Ethical approval for this 
study was obtained from the Kent School Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Ethics 
ID: 201815259101245011). 
In terms of participant characteristics, as shown in Table 1 groups were matched 
for verbal IQ, performance IQ, and full scale IQ, using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
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Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). They were also equated for chronological age, 




Materials, Procedures, and Scoring 
Experimental interoception tasks. 
Table 1 
Baseline Characteristics and Matching Statistics for Experiment 1.1  
 
Diagnostic Group  Group Differences 
 
ASD  Neurotypical   
t p d BF10 
(n = 22; 14 male) (n = 20; 14 male)   
CA: years 36.54 (12.01) 41.95 (13.94)  -1.35 .18 0.42 0.62 
VIQ 105.41 (11.18) 104.05 (11.22)  0.39 .70 0.12 0.32 
PIQ 106.41 (17.51) 105.60 (15.18)  0.16 .87 0.05 0.31 
FSIQ 106.32 (13.27) 105.65 (12.99)  0.16 .87 0.05 0.31 
BMI 26.14 (5.73) 26.31 (4.61)  -0.11 .92 0.03 0.31 
Heartrate 75.84 (16.20) 69.48 (12.79)  1.40 .17 0.44 0.66 
ADOS 9.27 (4.68) -  - - - - 
AQ total 32.86 (8.03) 14.25 (4.56)  9.34 <.001 2.85 >100 
RMIEa 25.36 (5.57) 27.80 (3.86)   -1.63 .06 0.51 1.60 
MASCa 28.32 (6.51) 33.75 (5.21)  -2.97 .01 0.92 16.73 
TAS-20 61.59 (11.47) 43.50 (9.38)  5.56 <.001 1.73 >100 
BDI-II  15.45 (11.64) 8.00 (6.05)  2.64 .01 0.80 3.78 
STAI 96.09 (20.63) 71.10 (18.80)  4.09 <.001 1.27 >100 
Time 
estimation 
.81 (.17) .74 (.17)  1.20 .24 0.37 0.54 
Memoryb  .86 (.07) .87 (.09)  -0.41 .69 0.13 0.33 
Note. CA = chronological age; VIQ = verbal IQ; PIQ = performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ; BMI = 
Body mass index; Heart Rate = Participant mean heartrate during the heartbeat tracking ask; ADOS = 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; AQ total = Total score on Autism-Spectrum Quotient; RMIE 
= Reading the Mind in the Eyes; MASC = Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; TAS-20 = 
Twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale; BDI-II = Becks Depression Inventory 2; STAI = State/Trait 
Anxiety Inventory; Time estimation = Mean accuracy (proportion) in time estimation control task; 
Memory = Mean accuracy (proportion) in memory control task. 
a  Values for one-tailed tests are reported because of a priori directional predictions.  
b  Memory data is missing for one TD participant. 
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 Heartbeat tracking task. 
We employed this widely used task to measure cardiac interoceptive accuracy and 
cardiac interoceptive awareness (Schandry, 1981). Participants were asked to silently count 
their heartbeats during four different time intervals (25s, 35s, 45s, & 100s), having their 
eyes closed and being seated in an upright position. The order of intervals was randomised 
across participants. Throughout the task, a finger pulse oximeter (Contec Systems CMS-
50Dþ; Qinhuangdao, China) was attached to the index finger of their dominant hand, 
recording their heartrate. An auditory tone signalled the beginning and the end of each 
trial. Within this time period, participants were instructed to “feel their heart from the 
inside and count their heartbeats”. They were given strict guidelines not to take their pulse 
or touch any part of their body that could facilitate the detection of their heartbeats.  
At the end of each trial, participants were asked to type in the estimated number of 
their heartbeats, using a PC keyboard. Subsequently, they gave a confidence judgment 
(JoC) based on how confident they felt about the accuracy with which they estimated their 
heartbeats. In order to give a JoC, they used a 5-point scale, ranging from “I d n’t know” 
to “I am sure”.2   
Cardiac interoceptive accuracy was quantified using the formula: 1 – (actual 
number of heartbeats – counted number of heartbeats) / ((actual number of heartbeats + 
counted number of heartbeats)/2), with scores taking values between -1 and 1 (Garfinkel et 
al., 2016b; Hart, McGowan, Minati, & Critchley, 2013; Nicholson et al., 2018). We opted 
for this way to quantify interceptive accuracy, as the formula described above takes into 
account both under and over heartbeat estimations and thus provides scores less prone to 
positive accuracy bias (Nicholson et al., 2018). Cardiac interoceptive accuracy was 
extracted for each trial and then a mean score was calculated for each participant, 
averaging their accuracy scores across the four different time intervals. Large positive 
scores indicate high cardiac interoceptive accuracy.  
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Following Garfinkel et al.’s (2015) approach, we quantified cardiac interoceptive 
awareness calculating a Pearson r correlation for each participant, indicating the 
correspondence between interoceptive accuracy and JoC (see also Forkmann et al., 2016). 
Large positive correlation coefficients imply high interoceptive awareness. Cardiac 
interoceptive awareness data is missing for three participants (one ASD/two TD), due to 
lack of variability in their JoC responses.  
 Respiratory interoception task.  
This task, which is a modified version of a novel paradigm designed by Murphy et 
al. (2018a), was employed to measure respiratory interoceptive accuracy and respiratory 
interoceptive awareness. Participants were instructed to exhale with a particular intensity 
(weak, medium, and firm) into a peak flow meter (Mini-Wright) and after 15s to exhale for 
a second time (comparator blow), with the intention of matching the intensity of the prior 
exhalation (actual blow). Disposable mouthpieces were used.  
Each participant completed three consecutive trials for each intensity, with the 
order of intensities being counterbalanced across participants. During the administration of 
the experimental task, participants neither were informed about their scores nor could see 
them, as a cardboard was attached to the base of the peak flow meter and thus they were 
instructed to rely solely on their feelings to recreate the intensity of the actual blow. 
Between the different intensities, a 40s break was given to participants to allow their 
breathing to return to normal. Before the beginning of the task, each participant completed 
at least one practice trial for each intensity.  
At the end of each trial, participants marked their level of confidence in a paper and 
pencil JoC task, using a 5-point scale that ranged from “I don’t know” to “I am sure”. The 
higher the score the greater the confidence that the intensity of the each comparison blow 
had been accurately matched with the intensity of the actual blow. Due to an error in the 
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data collection process, confidence judgements were elicited only from 15 participants 
with ASD and 19 comparisons.  
As regards to the scoring, first we calculated an accuracy score for each trial, using 
the formula: 1 – (score on the actual blow – score on the comparator blow) / ((score on the 
actual blow + score on the comparator blow)/2). Then, we averaged accuracy scores for 
each intensity and finally we calculated a grand mean, with large positive scores indicating 
high respiratory interoceptive accuracy.  
Respiratory interoceptive awareness was quantified calculating a Pearson r 
correlation for each participant, indicating the correspondence between respiratory 
interoceptive accuracy and JoC. Large positive correlation coefficients imply high 
interoceptive awareness. Respiratory interoceptive awareness data is missing for one TD 
participant, due to lack of variability in their JoC responses. 
“Control” tasks. 
Time estimation.  
We used this task to control for the potential confound effect of time estimation on 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy (e.g. Ainley, Brass, & Tsakiris, 2014; Shah et al., 2016). 
Following the same procedure as in the heartbeat tracking task, participants were asked to 
count the number of seconds of three different time intervals (19, 37, & 49s), with the 
order of intervals being randomised across participants.  
Accuracy was quantified using the same formula that used to measure cardiac 
interoceptive accuracy. That is 1 – (actual number of seconds – counted number of 
seconds) / ((actual number of seconds + counted number of seconds)/2). A mean accuracy 
score was calculated for each participant. Large positive scores indicate high accuracy in 
time estimation. 
Memory task.  
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Between-group differences in respiratory interoceptive accuracy could be explained 
by between-group differences in short-term memory for internal effort. Therefore, we 
employed a memory control task to compare performance on the respiratory interoception 
task, in order to ensure that short-term memory would not have any confound effect on our 
results. In this task, participants were asked to press the “b” key of a keyboard down, 
producing a tone and then release the key whenever they wanted to. Subsequently, they 
were asked to repeat the task with the aim of pressing the button down for the same length 
of time, as they previously did. They were instructed to rely solely on their feelings to 
recreate the duration of the prior tone and not to count seconds. Participants completed one 
practice trial and then nine experimental ones.  
Accuracy in each trial was calculated using the formula: 1 – (actual number of 
seconds – comparison number of seconds) / ((actual number of seconds + comparison 
number of seconds)/2). A mean accuracy score was calculated for each participant, 
averaging their accuracy scores across the nine trials.  
Mindreading tasks. 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RMIE) test.  
The RMIE (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) is a reliable and widely used measure of 
mindreading abilities in general and clinical populations (e.g. Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, 
Berger, & Herpertz, 2007). In this task, individuals are presented with a series of 36 
photographs showing the eye-region of males and females, and they are asked to choose 
among four different options the emotion/feeling that best describes the mental state of the 
depicted person. Scores range from 0 to 36, with higher scores indicating better 
mindreading abilities.  
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC). 
The MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006) is a reliable and widely used measure of 
mindreading abilities in general and clinical populations (e.g. Martinez et al., 2017; Shah et 
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al., 2017. In this task, individuals are asked to watch a 15-minute movie about four 
characters getting together for a dinner party. The video is paused 46 times and questions 
concerning the characters’ feelings, thoughts, and intentions are asked. All of the answers 
are multiple choice and require one option to be selected from a choice of four. Scores 
range from 0 to 46, with higher scores indicating better mindreading abilities. The task also 
involves six control questions, assessing attention and understanding of non-social aspects 
of the plot.  
Self-report measures.  
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ).  
The AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b) is a widely used self-report questionnaire that 
measures reliably ASD traits, in both general and clinical populations (e.g. Reed, Lowe, & 
Everett, 2011; Williams et al., 2018a). In this task, individuals are asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agree with each of the 50 statements (e.g., “I find social situations 
easy”) that the questionnaire comprises, using a 4-point Liker scale, ranging from 
“definitely agree” to “definitely disagree”. Scores range from 0 to 50, with higher scores 
indicating more ASD traits. A score of ≥ 26 is the cut-off point that denotes clinically 
significant levels of autism traits (Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-
Cohen, 2005). 
Beck Depression Inventory 2 (BDI-II).  
The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a reliable and widely used self-report 
questionnaire that consists of 21 aspects of depression (e.g. O'hara & Swain, 1996). In this 
questionnaire, individuals are asked to choose one statement for each aspect of depression 
that best describes their feelings the last two weeks including the day of the testing session 
(e.g. I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it). Each statement is rated on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 3, with 0 being equivalent to no presence of the aspect and 3 indicating 
strong presence of the aspect. Scores range from 0 to 63, with higher scores indicating 
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more severe depressive symptoms. A total score was obtained for each participant by 
summing all their responses.  
State-trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI).  
The STAI (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) is a reliable and 
widely used self-report questionnaire that measures state and trait anxiety (e.g. Bryant, 
Harvey, Dang, Sackville, & Basten, 1998). The STAI comprises 40 statements; half of 
them refer to current states, while the rest refer to general trait states. First, individuals are 
presented with statements such as “ I feel calm”, and they are asked to rate these 
statements, using a 4-point scale, ranging from “not at all” to “very much so”, based on 
their current feelings. These measure state anxiety. Then, individuals are presented with 
the statements that measure trait anxiety, such as “I am a steady person”, and they are 
asked to rate these statements using a 4-point scale, ranging from “almost never” to 
“almost always”, based on how they generally feel. Scores range from 40 to 160, with 
higher scores indicating greater levels of anxiety. We calculated an overall score of anxiety 
for each participant, by summing their state and trait anxiety subscores. 
20-Item Toronto alexithymia scale (TAS-20).  
The TAS-20 (Parker et al., 1994) is a reliable and widely used self-report 
questionnaire that assesses people’s ability to identify and describe feelings and emotions 
(e.g. Szatmari et al., 2008). It comprises 20 statements (e.g “I am able to describe my 
feelings easily”) with which individuals have to answer whether they completely disagree 
or completely agree on a 5-point scale. Scores ranges from 20 to 100. A score of ≥ 61 
indicates clinically significant levels of alexithymia. 
Body mass index (BMI). 
Participants’ BMI was calculated using the following formula, BMI = (weight (kg) 
/ height (cm))/height (cm).3 
Statistical Analysis  
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In the current experiment, the alpha level of .05 was the criterion for statistical 
significance, but when a-priori directional predictions were made, values for one-tailed 
tests were reported. The analysis approach was to conduct independent samples t-tests to
examine between group differences and pairwise correlations to examine the strength of 
association between variables. Given the small number of variables, pairwise correlations 
were sufficient to let us confirm or reject the hypotheses of the current studies. With 
respect to indices of effect size, we reported partial eta squared (��2) values when ANOVA 
tests were conducted (≥ .01 = small effect, ≥ .06 = moderate effect, ≥ .14 = large effect; 
Cohen, 1969) and Cohen’s d values (≥ 0.20 = small effect, ≥ 0.50 = moderate effect, ≥ 0.80 
= large effect; Cohen, 1969) for t-tests. In correlational analyses, coefficients r ≥ 10 
indicated a small effect size, ≥ 30 indicated a moderate effect size, and values ≥ 50 
indicated a large effect size (Cohen, 1992).  
In addition to p-values, we calculated another indicator that allowed us to make 
inferences based on our data. Bayesian analysis is an alternative to null hypothesis 
significance testing that steadily gains ground in the field of social sciences and has been 
used in similar with our projects studies (Nicholson et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2016; 
2018a; 2018b). Bayes factors enabled us to determine whether null results were due to 
sample insensitivity or because the effect under examination was minimal in the 
population (Wagenmakers, 2007).  When a-priori directional predictions were made, BF10  
values for one-tailed tests were reported. According to Jeffreys’s (1961) criteria, Bayes 
factors > 1 indicate increasing evidence for the alternative hypothesis over the null 
hypothesis (1 - 3 = anecdotal evidence; 3 - 10 = substantial evidence; 10 - 30 = strong 
evidence; 30 - 100 = very strong; values > 100 = decisive evidence). Whereas, scores < 1 
indicate evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis (1 - 0.33 = 
anecdotal evidence; 0.33 - 0.10 = substantial evidence; 0.10 - 0.03 = strong evidence; 0.03 
- 0.01 = very strong evidence; scores < 0.01 decisive evidence). All the reported Bayesian 
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analyses were performed using the statistical software package JASP 0.8.1.2 (JASP Team, 
2016) and thus we used the default prior; that is a zero-centered Cauchy distribution. 
Please note that the same method of statistical analysis was followed in all the studies 
included in the current project.  
Experiment 1.1: Results 
Interoceptive Accuracy   
First, a series of correlation analyses revealed small and non-significant 
associations between interoceptive accuracy for either cardiac or respiratory interoceptive 
domain and any of the control variables (age, BMI, anxiety symptoms, depressive 
symptoms, mean heartrate, timing accuracy, and memory accuracy). All ps were greater 
than .05 and all rs smaller than .30, without applying corrections for multiple correlations. 
More crucially, Table 1 shows that groups were matched for the most of these key 
variables. Significant between-group differences were found only in anxiety and 
depressive symptoms, with participants with ASD scoring significantly higher than control 
participants in STAI and BDI-II , as expected based on the literature regarding comorbidity 
in ASD (e.g., Simonoff et al., 2008).  
As shown in Figure 1, interoceptive accuracy was undiminished among participants 
with ASD. An independent sample t-test revealed no significant between-group differences 
in interoceptive accuracy, either in cardiac, t(40) = 0.26, p = .80, d = 0.08, BF10 = 0.31 or 
in respiratory domain, t(40) = -0.35, p = .73, d = 0.11, BF10 = 0.32. However, based on 
these results we cannot exclude the possibility that there were differences in the case of 
participants with ASD who had clinically significant levels of alexithymia.  
In order to examine the “alexithymia hypothesis”, we followed Nicholson et al.’s 
approach. (2018). That is to say, we divided the ASD group in two sub-samples. 
Participants who scored above the cut-off point (≥ 61) on TAS-20 were classified in the 
“high alexithymic” group (n = 14), whereas those who scored lower were classified in the 
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“low alexithymic” group (n = 8). These sub-groups were equated for VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ, 
ADOS total score (all ps ≥ .35, all ds ≤ 0.42), and sex, x2 (1) = 0.01, p = .93. Although, 
there was a marginally significant between-group difference in age, t(19) = 1.77, p = .09, d 
= 0.70, with participants in the “low alexithymic” group being younger (M = 31.75, SD = 
5.92), compared to participants in the “high alexithymic” group (M = 39.29, SD = 13.86), 
age did not correlate significantly with interoceptive accuracy, r = 12, p = .44. Therefore, 
the between-group difference in age cannot provide an explanation for the results reported 
below. As shown in Table 2, there was no significant difference between ASD participants 
with clinically significant levels of alexithymia and without, either in cardiac or in 
respiratory interoceptive accuracy. One thing to note, groups were matched for FIQ, 




Figure 1. Average accuracy in cardiac and respiratory interoceptive domain among ASD 
















































Interoceptive Awareness  
In both interoceptive domains, the mean correlation coefficient (Pearson r) between 
interoceptive accuracy and JoC was higher among neurotypical participants than ASD 
participants, yet that difference did not reach the level of statistical significance (see Table 
3). Nonetheless, aseries of one-sample t-tests showed that the mean coefficient for cardiac 
interoceptive awareness was significantly different from zero in the comparison group, 
t(17) = 1.96, p = .03, d = 0.46, BF10 = 2.21 (one - tailed) whereas it was at chance level in 
the ASD group t(20) = 0.28, p = .78, d = 0.06, BF10 = 0.24. That was also the case within 
the respiratory interoceptive domain. In the comparison group, awareness was significantly 
above chance, t(17) = 2.38, p = .02, d = 0.56, BF10 = 4.30 (one - tailed), but it remained at 









Means (SDs) and Inferential Statistics for Differences among “High Alexithymic” and 
“Low Alexithymic” Group in Cardiac and Respiratory Interoceptive Accuracy 
Interoceptive 
Accuracy 





 t p d BF10 
Cardiac Domain .57 (.29) .58 (.16)  -0.19 .85 0.08 0.40 
Respiratory Domain .88 (.04) .88 (.06)   -0.12 .91 0.06 0.40 












Association Analyses  
A series of correlation analyses was conducted exploring the relations between 
mindreading abilities and interoceptive awareness. As shown in Figure 2, the mean 
correlation coefficient, used as index of respiratory interoceptive awareness was positively 
and significantly associated with performance on MASC among participants with ASD, r = 
.56,  p = .02, BF10 = 5.32 (one-tailed), yet it did not reach the level of statistical 
significance among neurotypical participants, r = .13, p = .30, BF10 = 0.45 (one-tailed). 
However, a Fisher’s Z test indicated that there was not a significant difference in the 
association observed among ASD and comparison participants, Z = 1.30, p = .19. In 
cardiac interoceptive domain, the mean correlation coefficient between accuracy and JoC 
was not significantly associated with performance on MASC either among ASD or 
comparison participants (all rs  ≤ .19, all ps ≥ .22, , and all BF10s ≤ .42, one tailed). In 
addition, we did not find significant associations between either cardiac or respiratory 
interoceptive awareness and mindreading abilities, when measured using the RMIE task 
among ASD or comparison participants (, all rs ≤ .15, all ps ≥ .27and all BF10s ≤ 0.47, one 
tailed). 
Table 3 
Means (SDs) and Inferential Statistics for Group Differences in Cardiac and 
Respiratory Interoceptive Awareness 
Interoceptive 
Awareness  
Diagnostic Group  Group Differences 
ASD Neurotypical  t p d BF10 
Cardiac Domaina .03 (.57) .28 (.60)  -1.30 .10 0.42 1.06 
Respiratory Domainb .16 (.41) .26 (.46)  -0.62 .27 0.22 0.55 
Note. Values for one-tailed tests are reported because of a priori directional predictions.  
a ASD: n = 21; Neurotypical: n = 18. 
b ASD: n = 15; Neurotypical: n = 18.  
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of respiratory interoceptive awareness vs mindreading abilities 
among (a) ASD and (b) neurotypical participants.  
 
Experiment 1.1: Discussion 
To date, no study had examined the extent to which individuals diagnosed with 
ASD can sense accurately the physiological conditions of their body and provide accurate 
beliefs about their ability to judge their own internal states, by exploring two different 
interoceptive domains within a single experiment. As such, our primary aim was to 
examine interoceptive accuracy and interoceptive awareness of individuals with ASD, in 
both cardiac and respiratory domains.  
In terms of the first central experimental finding, the current experiment did not 
find any evidence to support the hypothesis that interoceptive accuracy is diminished in 
ASD. The difference in cardiac interoceptive accuracy between participants with ASD and 
neurotypical participants was non-significant and very small (d = 0.08). In keeping with 
this finding, the between-group difference in respiratory interoceptive accuracy was also 
non-significant and very small (d = 0.11). In addition, a Bayesian analysis of the between-
group difference in cardiac and respiratory interoceptive accuracy indicated that the data 
provided substantial evidence in favour of the null hypothesis for both interoceptive 
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Moreover, these results are consistent with prior studies that indicated undiminished 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy among individuals with ASD (Nicholson et al., 2018; Shah 
et al., 2016) and no significant relation between autism traits and either cardiac or 
respiratory interoceptive accuracy (Murphy et al., 2018a; Nicholson et al., 2018).  
One point to note here is that a series of extraneous factors has been suggested to 
have a confound effect on performance on the heartbeat tracking task. For example, high 
body mass index (BMI) and high levels of anxiety and depression have been found to 
adversely affect cardiac interoceptive accuracy (De Pascalis, Alberti, & Pandolfo, 1984; 
Garfinkel et al., 2016b; Herbert et al., 2014; Murphy et al., 2018c; Rouse et al., 1988). 
Crucially in our study, participants with ASD were closely matched with neurotypical 
participants in terms of their body mass index, age, and intelligence, and thus we overcame 
a common limitation in previous research (Garfinkel et al., 2016b; Nicholson et al., 2018). 
In addition, we measured participants’ level of depression and anxiety. As expected, 
participants with ASD group showed significantly higher levels of depression and anxiety, 
compared to neurotypical participants (McManus, Bebbington, Jenkins, & Brugha, 2016; 
Simonoff et al., 2008). Nonetheless, their r lation to interoceptive accuracy was non-
significant. Additionally, it has been found that the ability of accurate time estimation can 
increase performance on the heartbeat tracking task (Ainley et al., 2014; Shah et al., 2016). 
Using the same line of reasoning, it could be argued that performance on the respiratory 
interoception task can be influenced by short-term memory for internal effort. 
Nevertheless, in the current study groups had equivalent performance in both control tasks 
(time estimation/ memory). Overall, we can argue that none of these extraneous factors had 
a confound effect on the current findings, providing reassurance that we did not 
erroneously conclude that interoceptive accuracy is undiminished in ASD.  
From a theoretical perspective, the current experiment challenges the idea that 
mindreading deficits in ASD stem from impaired interoceptive accuracy, due to a damaged 
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oxytocin system (Quatrocki & Friston, 2014). As expected, we found a large and 
significant ASD-specific impairment in mindreading, as measured using the MASC 
(alongside a marginally significant and moderate between-group difference in performance 
on the RMIE). These results are in keeping with previous research findings (e.g. Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001a; Dziobek et al., 2006; Yirmiya et al., 1998) and indicate that 
participants with ASD who took part in the current experiment had significant mindreading 
deficits. Based on that, and if Quatrocki and Friston’s (2014) hypothesis was correct we 
should have found impaired interoceptive accuracy among participants with ASD. 
Nevertheless, this was not the case in the current experiment.  
Moreover, our findings provide a significant challenge to the “alexithymia 
hypothesis” (e.g. Bird & Cook, 2013; Bird et al., 2010; Brewer et al., 2015; Cook et al., 
2013). According to this hypothesis, individuals with ASD have interoceptive deficits only 
when alexithymia co-occurs with ASD. This theoretical account has been partly built upon 
the speculation that a significant difference in interoceptive accuracy between individuals 
with ASD and neurotypical individuals would be apparent if individuals with ASD had 
elevated levels of alexithymia (Shah et al., 2016). In the current experiment, we examined 
the extent to which this speculation can be confirmed by research evidence, adopting 
Nicholson et al.’s (2018) approach. That is to say, we directly contrasted an ASD “high 
alexythimic” group with an ASD “low alexythimic” group in terms of their cardiac and 
respiratory interoceptive accuracy. The between-group differences in both interoceptive 
domains were non-significant and very small (Cardiac: d = 0.08; Respiratory d = 0.06), 
with the Bayes factors indicating that the data provided anecdotal evidence for the null 
hypotheses.  
Overall, we can argue that the findings of the current experiment are more 
consistent with the theoretical claim that individuals with ASD have intact physical self-
awareness because their ability to make first order representations is undiminished (Lind, 
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2010; Nicholson et al., 2018; Uddin, 2011; Williams, 2010). However, this intact ability 
speaks only for the accurate detection of physiological body sensations, and by no means 
implies their correct interpretation (Nicholson et al., 2018).  
In terms of the second central experimental finding, the current experiment found 
moderate evidence to support the hypothesis that interoceptive awareness is diminished in 
ASD. Although neurotypical participants had higher interoceptive awareness, compared to 
participants with ASD, the between-group difference was marginally significant and small 
(d = 0.42) within the cardiac interoceptive domain and non-significant and small (d = 0.22) 
within the respiratory domain. According to Bayesian analyses, the data provided just 
anecdotal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis for the respiratory domain. 
Nonetheless, we crucially found that beliefs of participants with ASD about their ability to 
judge their own internal states were random. In both interoceptive domains, awareness was 
at chance level, among participants with ASD but significantly above chance among 
neurotypical participants. Given that the study of interoceptive awareness in ASD is almost 
non-existent, the current findings provide the first evidence that the ability to represent first 
order representations of body sensations upon cognition appears to be diminished in ASD. 
This is important because this is the mechanism that has been proposed to be involved in 
the correct interpretation of physical internal states (Nicholson et al., 2018).  
In terms of associations, this was the first study that examined the relation between 
interoceptive awareness and mindreading abilities. As predicted, we found a significant 
and large (r = .56) association between performance on MASC and respiratory 
interoceptive awareness in the ASD group. Despite not replicating this finding among 
neurotypical participants, we found that the size of the shared variance between 
performance on MASC and respiratory interoceptive awareness was the same in both 
groups, indicating that metarepresentational abilities provide a link between mindreading 
and interoceptive awareness (e.g. Carruthers, 2009). Non-significant associations were 
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found when mindreading abilities were measured with the RMIE task, as well as within the 
cardiac interoceptive domain.  
In sum, the current experiment provides further evidence of undiminished 
interoceptive accuracy in ASD, but also of diminished interoceptive awareness in adults 
with ASD. As such, we could argue that lower order phenomena of self-awareness are 
intact in ASD, but higher order phenomena appear to be impaired. Nonetheless, in order to 
increase our confidence in the last assumption, in the next chapter we also explored 
metacognition in ASD, conducting two experiments and using one of the most widely used 
indices of metacognitive monitoring abilities. That is judgements of confidence accuracy.    
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2. Exploring Implicit and Explicit Judgements of Confidence in ASD 
Much of the evidence regarding metacognitive monitoring in ASD has emerged 
from studies that explored judgments of confidence accuracy (JoC) among children with 
ASD. Nonetheless, strong conclusions cannot be drawn from these studies, given that their 
results have been to a great extent contradictory (Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2016; 
McMahon, Henderson, Newell, Jaime, & Mundy, 2016; Wilkinson, Best, Minshew, & 
Strausset, 2010; Williams et al., 2016; Wojcik, Allen, Brown, & Souchay, 2011). Having 
said that, when metacognitive monitoring abilities were examined in the real-world setting 
of mathematics learning, students with ASD showed clear deficits in their ability to judge 
their performance and discrepancy between pre-test and post-test intentions about their 
performance, indicating diminished metacognitive monitoring abilities (Brosnan et al., 
2016).  Nonetheless, to date, only three studies have investigated JoC accuracy in the 
population of adults with ASD and one study has explored the relation between autism 
traits and accuracy of JoC in the general population.  
Williams, Bergstrom, and Grainger (2016) explored the associations among autism 
traits, mindreading abilities and explicit JoC accuracy among individuals from the general 
population. Despite finding a significant association between mindreading and explicit JoC 
accuracy, indicating that both rely on metarepresentatio al abilities, the association 
between autism traits and JoC accuracy was non-significant. As such, Williams et al. 
(2016) concluded that people’s ability to impute mental states to themselves is unrelated 
their autism traits. Nonetheless, this did not exclude the possibility that individuals with 
ASD would show diminished JoC accuracy.  
Wilkinson et al. (2010) employed an explicit JoC task, following a facial 
recognition task among 16 adults with ASD and 15 neurotypical adults matched for age 
and IQ. Participants’ judgments of confidence were elicited using a 3-point scale, ranging 
from “certain” to “guessing”. Wilkinson et al. (2010) found that whilst JoC accuracy in the 
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ASD group was not significantly different between “certain” and “somewhat certain” 
judgements, there was a significant difference in the comparison group. Furthermore, in 
the ASD group JoC accuracy was 72% for “certain” judgements, whereas the same 
percentage was 85% for the comparisons. That difference may not reach the level of 
statistical significance, but it was moderate in size (d = 0.53). This evidence led Wilkinson 
et al. (2010) to conclude that subtle metacognitive monitoring atypicalities are present in 
ASD. Nonetheless, we cannot draw firm conclusions from this study because it is well-
established that individuals with ASD have diminished face processing abilities (Riby, 
Doherty-Sneddon, & Bruce, 2008; Riby & Hancock, 2008), and thus diminished object-
level performance in the facial recognition task could have a confound effect in JoC
accuracy among the ASD group (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). 
Sawyer, Williamson, & Young (2014) employed an explicit JoC task and two 
different tasks (emotion recognition & general knowledge task) to measure object-level 
performance, among 30 adults with ASD and 52 neurotypical participants, matched for 
gender, verbal IQ, and full scale IQ. Sawyer et al. (2014) did not find significant between-
group differences in JoC accuracy, when ASD participants showed diminished 
performance in the emotion recognition task. Whereas, people with ASD showed 
diminished JoC accuracy compared to the comparison group, with the between-group 
difference being marginally significant (p = .06) when groups were matched for object-
level performance in the general knowledge task.  
Cooper, Plaisted-Grand, Baron-Cohen, and Simons (2016) employed an explicit 
JoC to measure metamemory, among 24 adults with ASD and 24 neurotypical participants, 
matched for age, verbal and non-verbal ability, and phonological and semantic fluency. 
They found that metamemory was diminished in the ASD group. Noteworthy, groups were 
also equated for their object-level performance.  
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Whilst absolute conclusions cannot be drawn from the studies described above, it 
could be argued that neither of them found large between-group differences that could be 
considered clinically significant. One possible explanation might be that explicit JoC tasks 
are not sensitive to detect metacognitive atypicalities, among high-functioning adults with 
ASD. This is plausible, given it has already been found that there are people with ASD 
who perform equivalently with neurotypical people in explicit mindreading tests. 
Nonetheless, their significantly diminished performance in implicit mindreading tests 
indicates that this achievement is more of the product of compensatory learning, rather 
than the effect of an intact inherent mindreading ability (Callenmark, Kjellin, Rönnqvist, & 
Bölte, 2014; Senju, 2012; Senju et al., 2009).  
As such, an implicit (non-verbal) measure might be more informative about 
metacognitive monitoring abilities in ASD. Implicit JoC tasks have already been used in 
comparative psychology in order to explore metacognitive monitoring among non-human 
primates (Beran, Smith, Coutinho, Couchman, & Boomer, 2009; Couchman, Coutinho, 
Beran, & Smith, 2010; Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003, 
Smith & Washburn, 2005; Washburn, Gulledge, Beran, & Smith, 2010) as well as in 
neurotypical children (Paulus, Proust, & Sodian, 2013). Nonetheless, to date accuracy of 
implicit JoC has never been examined in ASD.  
Experiment 2.1: Individual Differences 
Experiment 2.1 addresses this issue investigating the extent to which metacognitive 
monitoring abilities, as indexed by both explicit and implicit JoC accuracy scores, are 
associated with mindreading abilities and autism traits in the general population. In the 
current experiment, participants performed either the implicit or the explicit version of the 
gambling paradigm described below (Son & Kornell, 2005). All of them completed the AQ 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b; see p. 24 of the current project for a detailed description), the 
RMIE task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a; see p. 23 of the current project for a detailed 
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description), and the theory of mind clips (ToM) of the animations task (Abell, Happé & 
Frith, 2000), with the last two assessing mindreading abilities. In addition, we measured 
individual differences in risk aversion, with a view to controlling this in correlation 
analyses because based on Dienes and Seth’s findings (2009), it would be reasonable to 
suggest that any significant correlation might have been confounded by the degree of risk 
aversion manifested by an individual. 
The first aim of the current experiment was to examine the extent to which 
metacognitive monitoring is associated with mindreading abilities. Based on the theoretical 
claim that mindreading and metacognition are under the umbrella of the same 
metarepresentational faculty (Caruthers, 2009; Gopnik, 1993; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994; 
Hobson, 1990), and as both versions of the gambling paradigm tap metacognition (Son and 
Kornell, 2005; Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007), we expected to find a positive and 
significant association between mindreading and both explicit and implicit JoC accuracy.  
The second aim of the current experiment was to examine the extent to which 
metacognitive monitoring is associated with the number of ASD traits reported by 
individuals from the general population. Based on the claims of “one-system” theorists that 
metarepresentational abilities underlie both mindreading and metacognitive monitoring 
(e.g. Caruthers, 2009), and as it has been found that mindreading abilities are negatively 
associated with autism traits (e.g. Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001b; Williams et al., 2016), we 
predicted that autism traits would be negatively and significantly associated with both 
implicit and explicit JoC accuracy. 
Experiment 2.1: Method 
Participants 
Fifty-six undergraduate students (48 female) participated in this experiment, after 
they had given written, informed consent. Their average age was 19.46 (SD = 2.83; range 
= 18 to 39) years. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and none of 
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them was colour blind.  In addition, all were native English speakers, or spoke English to 
native-level proficiency, and none had a history of ASD, language impairment, or dyslexia, 
according to self-report. Participants were recruited via the Research Participation Scheme 
(RPS) of the UKC and they were offered course credits in partial fulfilment of their degree, 
for taking part in the experiment. Additionally, they received a performance-related 
monetary prize. Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Kent School 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Ethics ID: 201715129893444795).  
Materials, Procedures, and Scoring   
As in Experiment 1.1, participants completed the RMIE task (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001a) and the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b). We used a between-subjects design for 
the administration of the gambling task, in order to deter any possible confound effects 
from participants’ exposure to both versions (Charness, Gneezy, Michael, & Kuhnc, 2012). 
Thus, 28 participants completed the explicit version, and the rest of them completed the 
implicit one (n = 28). There were no significant between-group differences either in age, 
t(54) = 0.94, p = .35, d = 0.25, BF10 = 0.39 or in sex ratio, x2 (1) = 2.33, p = .13, BF10 = 
1.29.  
Gambling task. 
The gambling task is a modified version of the gambling paradigm designed by Son 
and Kornell (2005). First, participants were asked to make a psychophysical discrimination 
within a period of 3s, touching either the most densely pixelated of two boxes in one 
condition or the deepest blue of two boxes in the other one. The order of conditions was 
counterbalanced across participants. Following each discrimination, participants responded 
to different stimuli within 3s either as part of the implicit version of the gambling task (Son 
& Kornell, 2005) or as part of the explicit one. All stimuli were presented on a 22-in 
computer screen (see Figure 3 for a graphical representation of the task).  
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Participants were instructed that their goal would be to accumulate as many points 
as possible, over a 10-minute test period. At the end of the experiment, these points were 
converted into money. Both versions comprised 60 trials and had the same payoff 
structure. The “payment rules” were explained to participants at the beginning of the 
testing session, prior to a set of 10 warmup trials. At the end of the task, all participants 




















Implicit version.  
In the implicit version of the gambling task, the follow-up screen after each 
psychophysical discrimination choice displayed two shapes. That is a triangle and a circle. 
Clicking the triangle that represented the “high risk” option, participants would receive 30p 
Prize: £ 2.00 
Prize: £ 2.00 
Which box is the deepest 
blue? 
Are you confident? 
Yes  No 
+ 30p 
Prize: £ 2.00 
Prize: £ 2.00 









 Figure 3. Graphical representation of the procedure and stimuli used in the explicit-colours 
(top) and implicit-pixels (bottom) version of the gambling task. 
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if their previous discrimination were correct, but would lose 30p if it were incorrect. 
Clicking the circle that represented the “low risk” option, participants would gain just 10p 
for a previous correct discrimination, but would lose 10p for an incorrect one. When 
instructing participants, great care was taken not to use metacognitive language.  
Explicit version.  
In the explicit version of the gambling task, the follow-up screen after each 
psychophysical discrimination choice presented the following question: “Are you 
confident?”. Participants stated their judgment of confidence (JoC) in each of their 
previously given responses, by choosing one of the following binary items: “Yes” - “No”. 
Clicking the “Yes” option would give 30p if their previous discrimination were correct but 
would lose 30p if it were incorrect. Clicking the “No” option would give 10p for a 
previous correct discrimination but would lose 10p for an incorrect one.  
Scoring. 
In both versions, we calculated JoC accuracy scores using gamma correlations 
(Goodman & Kruskal, 1954). This measure has been recommended by Nelson (1984), and 
Nelson, Narens, and Dunlosky (2004) and has been extensively used in the study of 
metacognitive monitoring (e.g. Grainger et al., 2016; Sawyer, Williamsonn, & Young, 
2014; Williams et al., 2016). Gamma scores were used to measure the degree of 
association between object-level task performance and either explicit confident judgements 
or implicit ones. Gamma correlations take values between -1 and +1. Large positive scores 
indicate a good correspondence between the two variables, while a gamma of zero 
indicates no association. We calculated one gamma score for each participant using the 
formula (ad - bc)/(ad + bc), with “ab” representing concordant pairs (correct 
discriminations-high confidence/risk and incorrect discriminations-low confidence/risk) 
and “bc” discordant pairs (correct discriminations-low confidence/risk and incorrect 
discriminations-high confidence/risk). Gamma scores cannot be calculated in cases when 
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at least one of the pairs equals to zero. Therefore, following Snodgrass and Corwin’s 
(1988) recommendation, we corrected the raw data by adding 0.5 to each frequency. 
Furthermore, object-level performance was calculated as the proportion of correct 
psychophysical discriminations participants made in the first phase of each trial. 
Animations task. 
The animations task is based on Heider and Simmel’s (1944) animated triangles 
and is widely used in research to trigger the mindreading process and elicit individuals’ 
statements about mental states, actions, and interactions (e.g. Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & 
Husain, 2004). The task originally comprises three conditions. That is the goal-directed, 
the random, and the ToM one. All feature two triangles moving around and interacting in 
different ways (Abell et al., 2000, Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Castelli, Happé, 
Frith, & Frith, 2000). However, only the four ToM clips were used for the purposes of the 
current experiment. These clips feature a triangle responding to the mental states of 
another triangle. Each clip lasted between 34s and 45s and was presented twice on a 
computer screen. The first time participants were instructed to watch the clip silently, but 
the second time they were asked to describe what was happening in each clip while they 
were watching it. Their descriptions were audio-recorded, transcribed, and uploaded to a 
secure server of the University of Kent. We scored participants’ responses on each clip 
using a scale from 0 to 2, following Abell Happe, & Frith’s (2000) criteria. A ToM score 
was calculated for each participant by summing scores on each clip. 
Test of risk aversion.  
A modified version of the Arrow-Pratt measure was used to assess individual 
differences in aversion to risk (Dienes & Seth, 2009). Participants were asked to state the 
reservation price for a lottery ticket in two hypothetical scenarios (Dienes & Seth, 2009). 
The first trial included the following scenario: “Imagine there was a lottery for a £10 prize, 
which will be given to one of the ten ticket holders. How much would you pay for a 
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ticket?”. The second trial included the same scenario with the only difference that the prize 
was £100. An individual score of risk aversion was calculated for each participant by 
summing their two numerical answers. The higher the amount of money a participant was 
willing to pay the less their aversion to risk. Thus, high scores indicate low risk aversion. 
Following Dienes and Seth’s (2009) scoring, a total score > 11 indicates no risk aversion.4 
Experiment 2.1: Results 
Between-Group Differences  
Table 4 shows means (SD) for performance on the explicit and implicit version of 
the gambling task. In both versions, the mean gamma score was significantly above 
chance, indicating accurate explicit and implicit judgements of confidence, t(27) = 16.90, p 
< .001, d = 3.19, BF10 = 8.09 and t(27) = 8.10, p < .001, d = 1.53, BF10 = 1.25 respectively.  
Moreover, Table 4 indicates that groups can be considered equivalent when 
exploring correlations. Neither object-level performance, t(54) = 0.38, p = .70, d = 0.10, 
BF10 = 0.29 nor response bias, t(54) = 1.54, p = .13, d = 0.42, BF10 = 0.72 differ 
significantly between-groups. Groups were also equated for the proportion of “payment 
rules” that were recalled, t(54) = -0.72, p = .48, d = 0.19, BF10 = 0.33, and as shown in 




Descriptive Statistics for Performance on the Explicit and Implicit Version of the 
Gambling Task 
Variable 
Explicit  Implicit 
Mean (SD) 
Proportion of correct discriminations .74 (.08)  .73 (.11) 
Proportion of high confidence/risk responses .75 (.15)  .68 (.18) 
Gamma score .67 (.21)  .53 (.35) 
Proportion of “payment rules” recalled .88 (.26)   .92 (.20) 





A series of correlation analyses was conducted separately for the explicit and 
implicit version of the gambling task (see Table 6 and Table 7 respectively) exploring the 
relations among JoC accuracy, mindreading abilities and autism traits. Our sample was 
representative of the general population with respect to autism traits and mindreading 
abilities (see Appendix B). Given that the shared variance between risk aversion and 
explicit as well as implicit JoC accuracy was negligible, there was no need to control for 
the effect of risk aversion on any of the correlation analyses reported below.  
Contrary to our predictions, the association between either the implicit or the 
explicit JoC accuracy and performance in mindreading tasks (RMIE and ToM clips) was 
small and non-significant. However, a Fisher’s Z test revealed that neither the explicit JoC 
gamma ˟ RMIE correlation coefficient nor the implicit JoC gamma ˟ RMIE one differ 
significantly from the correlation coefficient (r = .25) reported by Williams et al. (2016) 
for a significant association between JoC gamma and performance on the RMIE task, Z = -
0.18, p = .85 and Z = -0.28, p = .78, respectively. Next, we explored the association 
between autism traits and JoC accuracy. Even though there was a significant correlation 
between AQ and RMIE (see Table 6), neither the explicit nor the implicit JoC accuracy 
correlated significantly with AQ.  
Table 5 
        
Descriptive Statistics for Major Study Variables and Results from t-Tests  
Variable  
Explicit  Implicit   Results 
Mean (SD)   t p d BF10 
AQ 16.64 (7.01)  14.86 (6.83)  0.97 .34 0.26 0.40 
RMIE 26.18 (4.80)  26.14 (4.87)  0.03 .98 0.01 0.27 
Animations 5.82 (1.57)  5.25 (2.10)  1.17 .25 0.31 0.54 
Risk Aversion 10.70 (10.47)   9.93 (6.58)   0.33 .74 0.09 0.28 
Note. AQ: Autism-Spectrum Quotient; RMIE: Reading the Mind in the Eyes; Animations: ToM 
animation clips. 
 





Experiment 2.1: Discussion 
In contrast with our predictions, we did not find a significant association between 
mindreading and metacognitive monitoring abilities, as indexed by performance in both 
versions of the gambling task. Nonetheless, the size of the association between 
performance on RMIE task and performance on the explicit version of the gambling task 
was almost identical to that reported by Williams et al. (2016) who found a significant 
Table 6        
Bivariate correlations in the Explicit Version of the Gambling Task 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Gamma: Explicit − -.21b .35c .15a .04a .21a -.08a 
2. Proportion of high confidence   
responses 
 − -.44*d -.17a .18b -.04a .46*d 
3. Object-level performance    − -.13a .01a .44*d -.32b 
4. AQ total    − .12a -.44*d .03a 
5. Risk Aversion total     − -.23b -.22b 
6. RMIE      − -.04a 
7. Animations       − 
Note. N = 28. 
*p < .05.        
aBF10 < 0.33 (supports the null hypothesis); bBF10 = 0.34-0.99 (anecdotal evidence for the null 
hypothesis); cBF10 = 1-2.99 (anecdotal evidence for the alternative hypothesis); d BF10 = 3-99 (supports 
the alternative hypothesis). 
Table 7        
Bivariate correlations in the Implicit Version of the Gambling Task 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Gamma: Implicit − .31b .31b -.01a .01a .19a -.05a 
2. Proportion of high risk responses  − .11a -.02a .25b -.15a .02a 
3. Object-level performance    − .22b .01a .16a .19b 
4. AQ total    − .17b -.19b -.08a 
5. Risk Aversion total     − .07a -.25b 
6. RMIE      − -.02a 
7. Animations       − 
Note. N = 28. 
aBF10 < 0.33 (supports the null hypothesis); bBF10 = 0.34-0.99 (anecdotal evidence for the null hypothesis). 
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association between explicit JoC accuracy and RMIE. That was also the case for the size of 
the association between performance on RMIE task and performance on the implicit
version of the gambling task. Given that Williams et al.’s (2016) sample size (N=83) was 
almost three times larger than the sample size of the current experiment, low power could 
provide an explanation for the non-significant results.  
Despite predicting a significant association between autism traits and metacognitive 
monitoring abilities neither the relation between explicit gamma and AQ was significant 
nor the relation between implicit gamma and AQ. According to Bayesian correlation 
analysis, our data provided anecdotal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis for both 
associations. When we examined the relation between mindreading abilities and autism 
traits, we found the typical result. That is to say, the association between AQ and RMIE 
was moderate and signifi cant among participants who completed the explicit version of the 
gambling task. This finding comes to add to prior research evidence that poor mindreading 
abilities are associated with higher autism traits in the general population (e.g. Baron-
Cohen, 2001b, Williams et al., 2016). One thing to note here is that performance on the 
ToM clips of the animation task did not correlate either with RMIE or with AQ. A closer 
examination of participant performance reveals that their mean score (M = 5.54, SD = 
1.84) was significantly lower compared to that (M = 7) reported by Abell et al. (2000) for 
neurotypical adults, t (55) = -5.96, p <.001. Given that 12.5% of our participants were not 
native English speakers, linguistic difficulties may have confounded their performance 
leading to non-significant results in terms of the correlations. Nonetheless, based on the 
link between AQ and RMIE it can be argued that individuals with high levels of autism 
traits have difficulties in imputing mental states to others but their ability to attribute 
mental states to themselves is unrelated to their autism traits (Williams et al., 2016). 
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However, the extent to which this is also the case among people diagnosed with 
ASD remains unclear until is directly explored. Previous research has indicated that a non-
significant association between autism traits and metacognitive monitoring abilities does 
not exclude the possibility that there is a significant difference between people with ASD 
and neurotypical people (Williams et al., 2016). This issue was addressed in Experiment 
2.2.  
Experiment 2.2: Case-Control 
In Experiment 2.2, we examined metacognitive monitoring abilities among 
individuals with a full diagnosis of ASD and neurotypical people, employing both versions 
of the gambling task described above (Son & Kornell, 2005). In addition, participants 
competed the RMIE (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) and the theory of mind clips (ToM) of the 
animations task (Abell et al., 2000). As it is well-established that individuals with ASD 
have attenuated mindreading abilities (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Senju et al., 2009; 
Yirmiya et al., 1998), we first predicted that participants with ASD would show 
diminished performance in both mindreading tasks, compared to comparison participants. 
Second, in keeping with  predictions that stem from “ ne-system” theory (e.g. Carruthers, 
2009), we expected significantly lower explicit and implicit gamma scores among 
participants with ASD, compared to neurotypical participants, indicating poor 
metacognitive monitoring abilities in ASD. Please note that the data reported in this 
experiment was collected as part of an Economic and Social Research Council grant 
awarded to my MSc supervisor, David Williams. Thus, the data were not collected by me, 
but I have analysed them independently. 
Experiment 2.2: Method 
Participants  
Twenty-three adults with ASD and 23 neurotypical adults participated in the 
current experiment, after they had given written informed consent. All participants had 
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normal or corrected to normal vision and none of them was colour blind. Participant 
characteristics and between-group differences are presented in Table 8.  Groups were 
closely matched for verbal IQ, performance IQ, and full scale IQ, using the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). They were also matched for 
chronological age and gender.  
All ASD participants had received formal diagnoses, according to established 
criteria (DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association 2000; ICD-10, World Health 
Organisation 1993). Meanwhile, their ASD severity was assessed using the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). Four participants scored 
below the ASD cut-off point (≥ 7), based on Lord et al.’s criteria (1989), but remained in 
the sample because results did not change substantially when excluded.5 In addition, five 
participants scored below the Autism Quotient cut-off score (≥ 26), but all of them scored 
above the ASD cut-off on ADOS and therefore were not excluded from the analyses. 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Kent School Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee.  
Materials, Procedures, and Scoring  
 
As in Experiment 2.1, all participants completed the RMIE (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001a), the ToM clips of the animations task (Abell et al., 2000), the AQ (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001b) and both versions of the gambling task. Materials, procedure and scoring 
remained identical across experiments, with the only difference that in the current 
experiment a within-subjects design was used. The implicit version of task was always 
presented and competed before the explicit one.6   
 









Experiment 2.2: Results 
As shown in Table 8, an independent sample t-test revealed significant between-
group differences in both RMIE task and ToM clips, with participants with ASD showing 
diminished mindreading abilities.  
Table 9 shows descriptive statistics and results from a series of t-tests for variables 
associated with performance on the implicit version of the gambling task. In line with our 
predictions, an independent sample t-t st revealed that participants with ASD showed 
diminished implicit gamma scores, compared to the control group.  
Noteworthy, as shown in Table 9 there was no significant between-group 
differences in the proportion of visual stimuli correctly discriminated, indicating that 
groups were matched for object-level task performance. Groups were also equated for 
response bias as well as for the proportion of “payment rules” that were correctly recalled 
Table 8 
Baseline Characteristics and Matching Statistics for Experiment 2.2 
 
Diagnostic group   Group Differences 
 
ASD  Neurotypical   
t p d BF10 
(n=23; 17 male) (n= 23; 17 male)   
CA: years 37.54 (12.62) 37.94 (12.55)  -0.40 .92 0.03 0.29 
VIQ 104.65 (12.62) 107.22 (9.43)  -0.78 .44 0.23 0.37 
PIQ 102.35 (19.68) 105.13 (11.71)  -0.58 .56 0.17 0.34 
FSIQ 103.52 (15.65) 106.61 (9.89)  -0.80 .43 0.24 0.38 
ADOSa 9.73 (4.58) -  - - - - 
AQ total 32.00 (8.14) 15.70 (5.62)  7.90 <.001 2.33 2.57 
Animationsb  3.91 (2.00) 5.13 (1.87)  -2.14 .02 0.63 3.44 
RMIEb 24.26 (5.76) 27.70 (3.72)  -2.40 .01 0.71 5.52 
Note. CA = chronological age at testing WASI; VIQ = verbal IQ; PIQ = performance IQ; FSIQ = 
full scale IQ; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; AQ total = Total score on Autism 
Spectrum Quotient; RMIE: Reading the Mind in the Eyes; Animations: ToM animations cl ps. 
aADOS data is missing for one ASD participant.  
bValues for one-tailed tests are reported because of a priori directional predictions.  
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after the end of the experiment. Thus, the significant between-group difference in implicit 




















Table 9        
Means (SDs) and Inferential Statistics for Group Differences in Performance in the 
Implicit Version of the Gambling Task 
Variable 
Group   Group Differences  
ASD Neurotypical   t p d BF10 
Proportion of correct 
discriminations 
.68 (.10) .71 (.10)  -1.1 .28 0.30 0.48 
Proportion of high risk 
responses 
.74 (.27) .77 (.20)  -0.38 .71 0.13 0.31 




.93 (.23) .97 (.11) 
  
-0.78 .44 0.22 0.38 
a   Values for one-tailed tests are reported because of a priori directional predictions. 
b Data is missing for two ASD participants. 
Table 10        
Means (SDs) and Inferential Statistics for Group Differences in Performance on the 
Explicit Version of the Gambling Task 
Variable 
Group   Group Differences  
ASD Neurotypical   t p d BF10 
Proportion of correct 
discriminations 
.70 (.09) .72 (.09)  -0.50 .62 0.22 0.32 
Proportion of high 
confidence responses 
.77 (.20) .76 (.18)  0.19 .85 0.10 0.30 
Gamma scorea .60 (.32) .63 (.27)  -0.24 .41 0.10 0.35 
Proportion of “payment 
rules” recalledb .92 (.16) .98 (.07)   -1.58 .13 0.48 0.86 
aValues for one-tailed tests are reported because of a priori directional predictions. 
b Data is missing for two ASD participants.  
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Table 10 shows descriptive statistics and results from a series of t-tests for variables 
associated with performance on the explicit version of the gambling task. Contrary to our 
predictions, an independent sample t-t st revealed no significant between-group 
differences in explicit gamma scores. Noteworthy, groups were matched for object-level 
task performance, response bias and for the proportion of “payment rules” that were 
recalled after the end of the experiment (see Table 10). Thus, our unexpected finding is 
unlikely to be explained by the effect of these variables. 
Experiment 2.2: Discussion 
In keeping with previous research findings, mindreading abilities were found to be 
diminished among this sample of adults with ASD (e.g. Yirmiya et al., 1998), indicating 
that our sample was representation of the ASD population. The between-group difference 
in performance on RMIE task was significant and moderate (d = 0.71), as it was also the 
between-group difference (d = 0.63) in scores on ToM clips.  
In terms of the difference between participants with ASD and neurotypical 
participants in metacognitive monitoring abilities as expected, the former showed 
diminished implicit gamma scores. The between-group difference in the size of these 
scores was significant and moderate (d = 0.63). Surprisingly though, when we assessed 
JoC accuracy using the explicit version of the gambling task, participants with ASD 
performed equivalently with neurotypical participants. The between-group difference was 
non-significant and very small (d = 0.10), but with the Bayesian analysis indicating that the 
data provided only anecdotal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis.  
2. General Discussion 
In the current chapter, we investigated explicit as well as implicit metacognitive 
monitoring abilities in ASD. In Experiment 2.1, despite not finding a significant 
association between mindreading abilities and metacognitive monitoring, as measured 
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either with the explicit or with the implicit version of the gambling task, the size of the 
shared variance between performance on RMIE and either the explicit or implicit JoC 
accuracy did not differ significantly from that reported by Williams et al. (2016). This is 
important because Williams et al. (2016) had a much larger sample than that tested here 
and thus more statistical power to detect a significant effect (N = 83). It is also worth 
mentioning that to date no study had explored the association between implicit JoC 
accuracy and mindreading abilities. Although further research needs to be done, our results 
provide tentative evidence that implicit ways of measuring metacognitive monitoring are 
metarepresenational and thus can be reliably used, as indices of higher order phenomena of 
self-awareness (Fleming & Dolan, 2010; Koch & Preuschoff, 2007; Persaud & McLeod, 
2008; Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007).  
In contrast with our predictions, we also did not find a significant association 
between either the explicit or the implicit JoC accuracy and the number of autism traits, as 
measured in the general population. These findings were keeping with previous evidence 
that the ability of neurotypical individuals to imputing mental states to themselves is 
unrelated to their autism traits (Williams et al., 2016). Nonetheless, this did not seem to be 
the case among individuals with ASD.  
In Experiment 2.2, we found diminished gamma scores among individuals 
diagnosed with ASD, when we employed the implicit version of the gambling task. This 
finding was in line with our predictions and consistent with “one-system” theorists’ claims 
that severe deficits in metacognition lie in the core of ASD because mindreading and 
metacognition share the same underling metarepresentational mechanism (Carruthers, 
2009; Gopnik, 1993; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994; Hobson, 1990). Despite that, unexpected 
results arose when we examined metacognitive accuracy employing the explicit version of 
the gambling task. That is to say, participants with ASD showed undiminished abilities. 
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One thing to note here is that in Experiment 2.2 ASD participants were closely 
matched with neurotypical participants in terms of verbal IQ, performance IQ, and full 
scale IQ. Moreover, we overcame a common limitation of previous studies of 
metacognition in ASD (Sawyer et al., 2014; Wilkinson et al., 2010), by equating groups for 
their object-level performance. As such, the unexpected results described above cannot be 
explained by between-group differences in these extraneous factors. Compensation though 
might be a more plausible explanation (Livingston & Happé, 2017).  
Based on the “compensation hypothesis”, we could speculate that participants with 
ASD might have used a compensatory strategy in order to achieve explicit JoC accuracy 
equivalent with neurotypical participants. To date, clear evidence for compensation in 
ASD has been found only in the study of mindreading abilities (Schneider, Slaughter, 
Bayliss, & Dux, 2013; Senju et al., 2009). With respect to metacognition, even though 
compensation has been proposed in prior studies as an explanation for non-significant 
differences between ASD and neurotypical people (Grainger et al., 2016), there were no 
findings to support this hypothesis.  
Crucially, this is the first study that contrasted explicit with implicit metacognitive 
monitoring abilities in ASD and found a difference between those two, which could be 
attributed to compensation. This is important because the study of compensation in ASD is 
very limited and thus, the current findings indicate that research in the area of 
metacognition might be fruitful for the understanding of compensation in ASD. 
Nevertheless, as it has already been noted metacognitive monitoring abilities do not entail 
only judgements of confidence; in the next chapter we explored metacognitive experiences 
of difficulty in ASD, as an alternative index of metacognitive monitoring.  
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3. Exploring Metacognitive Experiences of Difficulty in ASD 
In the current chapter, two experiments were conducted aiming to explore the 
extent to which ASD is characterised by atypical metacognitive experiences of difficulty. 
That is a relatively new area of metacognition that has never been explored before in ASD.  
Experiment 3.1: Individual Differences 
In Experiment 3.1, we investigated the extent to which accuracy of metacognitive 
experiences of difficulty relates to mindreading abilities or to autism traits. Individuals 
from the general population completed a masked priming paradigm (Desender et al., 
2016), the RMIE (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) task, and the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001b).  
The first aim of the current experiment was to replicate Desender et al.’s (2016) 
findings (see p. 7 of the current project). Second, we explored the association between 
accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty and mindreading abilities. “One-
system” theorists claim that both mindreading and metacognition are under the umbrella of 
the same metarepresentational faculty (e.g. Carruthers, 2009). If this is the case, then 
accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty should be positively and significantly 
associated with performance in mindreading tasks. Third, we aimed to examine the extent 
to which there is an association between accuracy of metacognitive experiences of 
difficulty and autism traits. As it is well-established that mindreading abilities are 
negatively associated with autism traits in the general population (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 
2001b; Williams et al., 2016), and based on the theoretical claim that mindreading and 
metacognition are dependent with each other (e.g. Carruthers, 2009), autism traits should 
be negatively and significantly associated with accuracy of metacognitive experiences of 
difficulty.  
Experiment 3.1: Method 
Participants  
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Seventy-nine undergraduate students (65 female) participated in this study after 
they had given written, informed consent. Their average age was 19.56 (SD = 2.23; range 
= 18 to 36) years. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were native 
English speakers or spoke English to native-level proficiency and had no history of ASD, 
language impairment, or dyslexia, according to self-report. Participants were recruited via 
the Research Participation Scheme (RPS) of the University of Kent, UK, and they received 
course credits in partial fulfilment of their degree for their participation. Ethical approval 
for this study was obtained from the Kent School Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
(Ethics ID: 201815215553564983).  
Materials, Procedures, and Scoring  
As in Experiment 2.1, participants completed the RMIE task (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001a) and the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b). In addition, they performed a masked 
priming task (Desender et al., 2016). 
Masked priming task. 
We employed this task to measure accuracy of metacognitive experiences 
difficulty. In each trial, following a fixation cross displayed for 1000ms on a 22" computer 
screen, a prime arrow (1.5° wide and 0.7° high) was presented for 34ms pointing either to 
the left or to the right side of the screen. Then, following a blank screen displayed for 
34ms, a target arrow (3.3°wide and1.4° high) was presented for 116ms pointing again 
either to the left or to the right. A blank screen followed, and participants had to respond as 
fast and accurately as possible to the direction of the target arrow. If the arrow pointed to 
the left, they should press the “d” key of a keyboard, using the middle finger of their left 
hand, but if the arrow pointed to the right, they should press the “k” key, using the middle 
finger of their right hand.  
Subsequently, when they responded within 3000ms, a blank screen was presented 
for 516ms, and the following metacognitive question was displayed: “How much difficulty 
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did you experience when responding to the arrow?”. Participants were instructed to press 
the key “o” with the ring finger of their right hand if they experienced “rather more 
difficulty” or the key “m” with the index finger of their right hand if they experienced 
“rather less difficulty”. No time limit was imposed on participants to give their 
metacognitive responses, and they had been instructed to use all the sources of information 
available in their mind before they gave a judgement of difficulty.   
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. Participants first completed 20 
practice trials in which the metacognitive questions were omitted. Next, they performed 20 
additional ones with the metacognitive questions being included. Each participant 
completed two blocks of 80 trials, with the trial order being randomised within blocks. On 
half the trials, the direction of the prime arrow was in congruency with the direction of the 
target arrow, rendering these trials easier for participants. On the other half, the direction of 
the two arrows was incongruent, creating a response conflict that made these trials more 
difficult. In both occasions, the prime arrow was invisible to participants, as it fitted 
exactly with the target arrow. Thus, participants were not consciously aware of which trials 
had an increased difficulty, compared to the other tones (see Figure 4 for a graphical 
representation of the task).  
Following the approach adopted by Desender et al. (2016), we excluded all the 
incorrect responses to the target arrow, along with the first trial of each block, and each 
trial that followed an incorrect response. On average, 4% of the trials were eliminated per 
participant. All the analyses reported below refer to that trimmed dataset.  
In terms of scoring, Desender et al. (2016) calculated conflict-d s ores, as index of 
accuracy of metacognitive experience of difficulty. Likewise, we used the same approach, 
employing the formula: conflict-d = Z(Hit Rate) – Z(False Alarm Rate). Hit rate (H) was 
calculated dividing the number of incongruent trials that participants experienced as 
“rather more difficult” (hits) by the number of hits plus the number of incongruent trials 
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experienced as “rather less difficult” (misses). False alarm rate (FA) was calculated 
dividing the number of congruent trials that participants experienced as “rather more 
difficult” (false alarms) by the number of false alarms plus the number of congruent trials 
that participants experienced as “rather less difficult” (correct rejections). The higher the 
conflict-d  the greater the accuracy.  
 Conflict-d scores cannot be calculated either when the hit rate is equal to one, or 
when the false alarm rate is equal to zero. As such, raw data were corrected using the 
formula 1 – 1/(2N) for hit rates, with N representing the maximum possible number of hits 
and the formula 1/(2N) for false alarm rates, with N representing the maximum possible 
number of false alarms (Macmillan & Kaplan, 1985). As in Desender et al. (2016), we also 




Figure 4. Graphical representation of the procedure and stimuli used in congruent (top) 
and incongruent (bottom) trials of the masked priming task. 
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Experiment 3.1: Results 
Metacognitive Experiences of Difficulty   
A one-sample t-test showed that the average conflict-d (M = .93, SD = .83) was 
significantly above chance, indicating that participants showed the expected metacognitive 
effect, t(78) = 9.91, p < .001, d = 1.11, BF10 > 100 (one-tailed). That is to say, they 
accurately classified incongruent trials as “rather more difficult” and congruent trials as 
“rather less difficult”. In addition, the average conflict-d was below ceiling, t(78) = -
1058.2, p < .001, BF10 > 100. 
Next, we examined the effect of trial difficulty on median RTs to the target arrow 
as well as the effect of these RTs on metacognitive responses. A 2 (congruency: 
incongruent/ congruent) x 2 (metacognitive judgement: “ra her more difficult” / “rather 
less difficult”) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on median RTs to the target 
arrow (see Figure 5). The analysis revealed that the main effect of congruency was non-
significant, F(1,78) = 2.34, p = .13, ��2 = .03, whereas the main effect of metacognitive 
judgement was significant reflecting slower RTs to the target arrow in trials that 
participants labelled as “rather more difficult”, than in trials labelled as “rather less 
difficult”, F(1,78) = 53.52, p < .001, ��2 = .41. Additionally, the interaction between 
congruency and metacognitive judgement was marginally significant, F(1,78) = 3.70, p = 
.06, ��2 = .05. This interaction was further investigated, using paired sample t-tests. 
Results from paired sample t-tests established the main effect of metacognitive 
judgement. That is “rather less difficult” judgements were made after quick responses, and 
“rather more difficult” judgements were made after slow responses in both congruent and 
incongruent trials, t(78) = -5.34, p < .001, BF10 = 3.56 and t(78) = -7.56, p < .001, BF10 = 
6.18 respectively. There was also a significant difference in median RTs between 
congruent and incongruent trials for “rather less difficult” judgements. In incongruent 
trials, participants gave significantly slower responses, than in congruent trials, t(78) = -
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6.57, p < .001, BF10 > 100. However, as shown in Figure 5 the difference between 
congruent and incongruent trials was only 40ms. Congruency did not have any effect on 
median RTs for “rather more difficult” judgements, t(78) = -0.21, p = .84, BF10 = 0.13.  
 
Figure 5. Median RTs to the target arrow in the masked priming task as a function of 
congruency and metacognitive response. Error bars represent standard error of 
measurement. 
 
Association Analyses  
 A series of correlation analyses was conducted to examine the associations among 
accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty (indexed by conflict-d), mindreading 
abilities, and autism traits. Our sample was representative of the general population with 
respect to autism traits and representative of student population in terms of mindreading 
abilities (see Appendix c). 
In line with our predictions, the association between conflict-d and RMIE was 
positive and marginally significant, r = .17, p = .07, BF10 = 0.74 (one-tailed). In addition, A
Fisher’s Z test revealed that the effect size of this association did not differ significantly 
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et al. (2016), Z = -0.55, p = .58 or from the coefficent JoC gamma ˟ RMIE reported in 
Experiment 2.1, Z = -0.20, p = .84. Nonetheless, in contrast with our predictions, the 
correlational analysis revealed a no significant association between conflict-d and AQ, r = 
-.03, p = .41, BF10 = 0.17 (one-tailed), indicating that accuracy of metacognitive 
experiences of difficulty was unrelated to autism traits, as measured in the general 
population.  
Experiment 3.1: Discussion 
In Experiment 3.1, we successfully replicated Desender et al.’s (2016) findings. 
That is to say, we found that participants from the general population classified congruent 
trials as “rather less difficult” and incongruent trials as “rather more difficult” at above 
chance level, indicating that their experiences of difficulty coincided to a great extent with 
the actual difficulty of each trial of the task. Nonetheless, it could be argued that this effect 
can be better explained by introspection on reaction times and visibility of the prime arrow, 
rather than by intact metacognitive monitoring abilities (Marti et al., 2010). 
In terms of the first alternative explanation, reaction time analyses showed that 
congruency had a significant effect on reaction times only in the case of trials labelled as 
“rather less difficult”, with participants responding 40ms faster in congruent trials, than in 
incongruent ones. As such, it is doubtful whether such a short difference in reaction times 
could even be noticeable in order to affect metacognitive responses. Therefore, we can 
conclude that in the current experiment accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty 
was not achieved by introspection on reaction times to the target arrow.  
The second alternative explanation seems more plausible, compared to the first one, 
given we did not examine the extent to which the prime arrow was visible to participants. 
This was something we could have controlled for employing a simple detection task, as 
Desender et al. (2016) did. Nevertheless, previous research findings have shown that either 
with zero visibility or with a mean visibility of d = 0.55, accuracy of metacognitive 
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experiences of difficulty was above chance level (Desender et al., 2014; 2016), indicating 
that the awareness of the prime arrow is distinct from the awareness of the conflict 
experience (Desender et al., 2014). As such, we can be confident enough that our results 
were not confounded by this factor and thus to use accuracy of metacognitive experiences 
of difficulty as index of metacognitive monitoring abilities. 
In terms of associations, as predicted accuracy of metacognitive experiences of 
difficulty was positively associated with mindreading abilities. Even though, the 
association was marginally significant and its effect size small (r = .17), their shared 
variance was equal to that reported in Experiment 2.2 for the association between explicit 
JoC accuracy and RMIE as well as to that reported by Williams et al. (2016). Crucially, to 
date this is the first study of the relation between metacognitive experiences of difficulty 
and mindreading abilities and arguably the current findings appear to provide some 
evidence in favour of the theoretical claim that metarepresentational abilities underlie not 
only mindreading but also metacognition (e.g. Carruthers, 2009).  
Furthermore, in contrast with our predictions the association between accuracy of 
metacognitive experiences of difficulty and autism traits was non-significant and trivial (r 
= -.03). The Bayesian correlation analysis suggested that the data provided substantial 
evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. Therefore, our findings indicate that the extent to 
which an individual from the general population reports high or low levels of autism traits 
is unrelated to their ability to impute mental states to themselves. Despite making this 
conclusion, it is still questionable whether this applies to people with a full diagnosis of 
ASD.  
Williams et al. (2016) found that the lack of a significant association between 
autism traits and an index of metacognition in the general population, by no means implies 
that the ASD folk will not be impaired. Qualitative differences in cognition could 
differentiate people with and without a diagnosis of ASD (Peterson et al., 2005; Ruzich et 
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al., 2015). As such, whilst we did not find a significant association between accuracy of 
metacognitive experiences of difficulty and individual differences in the number of autism 
traits, among people from the general population, in Experiment 3.2 we further explored 
this facet of metacognitive monitoring abilities among individuals with a full diagnosis of 
ASD.  
Experiment 3.2: Case-Control 
 In Experiment 3.2 we conducted a case-control study employing among individuals 
with ASD as well as neurotypical people the masked priming task used in Experiment 3.1, 
the RMIE (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) task and the MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006). As it is 
well-established that individuals with ASD have attenuated mindreading abilities (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen, 2001; Senju et al., 2009; Yirmiya et al., 1998), we first predicted that 
participants with ASD would show diminished performance in both mindreading tasks, 
compared to comparison participants. Second, in keeping with the theoretical claims of 
“one-system” theorists that mindreading and metacognition are inherently related with 
each other (e.g. Carruthers, 2009), we predicted that we would find a significant between-
group difference in performance on the masked priming task, with participants with ASD 
showing diminished accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty.  
Experiment 2: Method 
Participants  
Twenty-two adults with ASD and 20 neurotypical comparison adults participated in 
the current experiment, after they had given written informed consent.7 All participants 
with ASD had received formal diagnoses, according to established criteria (DSM-IV-TR, 
American Psychiatric Association 2000; ICD-10, World Health Organisation 1993), while 
their ASD severity was assessed using the ADOS .8 All neurotypical participants scored 
below the AQ cut-off score. Two ASD participants were excluded because their error rate 
in the masked priming task, which was the main experimental task of the current 
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experiment, was higher than 25% (following criteria set out by Desender et al., 2014). In 
the final sample, 20 participants with ASD and 20 neurotypical participants were included. 
As shown in Table 11 groups were matched for verbal IQ, performance IQ and full scale 
IQ, using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). They 
were also matched for chronological age and sex ratio. Ethical approval for this study was 
obtained from the Kent School Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Ethics 
ID: 201815259101245011). 
 
Materials, Procedures, and Scoring  
As in Experiment 3.1, all participants completed the RMIE (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001a), and the masked priming task (Desender et al., 2016). Materials, procedures, and 
scoring remained identical across experiments with the only difference that in the current 
experiment, participants completed only the second practice session of the masked priming 
Table 11 
Baseline Characteristics and Matching Statistics for Experiment 3.2  
 
Diagnostic group  Group Differences 
 
ASD  Neurotypical   
t p d BF10 
(n = 20; 12 male) (n = 20; 14 male)   
CA: years 36.80 (12.60) 41.95 (13.94)  -1.23 .23 0.39 0.56 
VIQ 106.80 (10.61) 104.05 (11.22)  0.80 .43 0.25 0.40 
PIQ 108.45 (15.62) 105.60 (15.18)  0.59 .56 0.19 0.35 
FSIQ 108.20 (11.47) 105.65 (12.99)  0.66 .51 0.21 0.37 
ADOS 9.45 (4.86) -  - - - - 
AQ total 33.20 (8.32) 14.25 (4.56)  8.93 <.001 2.82 >100 
RMIEa 25.50 (5.80) 27.80 (3.86)  -1.48 .07 0.47 1.31 
MASCa 28.25 (6.83) 33.75 (5.21)  -2.86 .00 0.91 13.32 
Note. CA = chronological age; VIQ = verbal IQ; PIQ = performance IQ; FSIQ = full scale IQ; ADOS = 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; AQ total = Total score on Autism-Spectrum Quotient; RMIE = 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes; MASC = Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition. 
aValues for one-tailed tests are reported because of a priori directional predictions. 
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task in which the metacognitive questions were included. In addition, participants 
completed the MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006; see pp. 23-24 X of the current project for a 
detailed description of the task). 
Experiment 3.2: Results 
Between-Group Differences  
With respect to performance on the masked priming task, as shown in Table 12 an 
independent samples t-test indicated that groups were equated for object-level task 
performance. That is to say, the proportion of correct responses to the target arrow among 
ASD participants was equivalent to neurotypical participants. Next, we examined the 
extent to which there was a significant between-group difference in accuracy of 
metacognitive experiences of difficulty (see Table 12 for descriptive and inferential 
statistics).  
 
An independent samples t-test showed that in contrast with our predictions, there 
was not a significant between-group difference in conflict-d, indicating that participants 
with ASD had undiminished accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty. 
Table 12        
Means (SDs) and Inferential Statistics for Group Differences in Performance on the 
Masked Priming Task 
Variable 
Group  Group Differences  
ASD Neurotypical   t p d BF10 
Object-level 
performance 





0.23 (0.18) 0.43 (0.13)  -3.88 <.001 1.27 66.13 
Conflict-da  0.69 (1.20) 0.57 (0.82)  0.36 .36 0.12 0.25 
 a  Values for one-tailed tests are reported because of a priori directional predictions. 
SELF-AWARENESS IN ASD  66   
 
Although, it became clear during testing that there was a substantial sex difference among 
autistic participants in performance on the experimental task a post-hoc analysis of sex 
differences has not been presented in the current thesis due to the small n per each group.  
Association Analyses  
A series of correlation analyses was conducted exploring the relations between 
mindreading abilities and accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty. Among the 
ASD participants neither the RMIE nor MASC correlated significantly with conflict-d, r = 
.06, p = .40, BF10 = 0.34 (one-tailed) and r = -.03, p = .45, BF10 = 0.25(one-tailed) 
respectively. When these associations were examined among neurotypical participants, 
conflict-d correlated significantly with MASC, r = .54, p = .01, BF10 = 9.60 (one-tailed) 
but not with RMIE, r = -.03, p = .45, BF10 = 0.25 (one-tailed). 
Experiment 3.2: Discussion 
As expected, we found a large and significant ASD-specific impairment in 
mindreading, as measured using the MASC (alongside a marginally significant and small 
between-group difference in performance on the RMIE). These results are in keeping with 
previous research findings (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a; Dziobek et al., 2006; Yirmiya 
et al., 1998) and indicate that participants with ASD who took part in the current 
experiment were representative of the ASD population with respect to mindreading 
abilities. 
 In contrast with our predictions, accuracy of metacognitive experiences of 
difficulty was found to be undiminished among this sample of adults with ASD. The 
between-group difference in the size of accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty 
was non-significant and very small (d = 0.12), with the Bayes factor suggesting that the 
data provided substantial evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. Based on these 
findings, it would be reasonable to suggest that the current experiment provides evidence 
for intact metacognitive monitoring abilities in ASD.  
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In terms of associations, as predicted accuracy of metacognitive experiences of 
difficulty was positively and significantly associated with mindreading abilities, as 
measured employing the MASC among neurotypical participants. Noteworthy, the size of 
the association was large (r = .54), suggesting that metarepresantional abilities were the 
source of their shared variance (29%). Nonetheless, all the other correlation analyses we 
conducted to examine the association between mindreading and accuracy of metacognitive 
experiences of difficulty produced non-significant results.  
3. General Discussion 
In the current chapter, were conducted two experiments aiming to explore 
metacognitive experiences of difficulty in ASD. In Experiment 3.1, we replicated previous 
research findings showing that neurotypical people can feel wh n they experience either 
increased or decreased difficulty, and that this experience coincides with the actual 
difficulty of the task they perform (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Desender et al., 2014, 
Desender et al., 2016; Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010). Arguably, this ability taps 
metacognitive monitoring, as individuals need to form metarepresentations of the first 
order representations of the task difficulty in order to state accurately their experience of 
difficulty (Desender et al., 2016). Results from association analyses increased our 
confidence in this suggestion.  
In Experiment 3.1, we found a marginally significant association between 
performance on the RMIE task and accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty. 
Likewise, in Experiment 3.2 we found a significant correlation between performance on 
MASC and accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty. These findings indicate 
that peoples’ ability to impute mental states to themselves is metarepresentational and thus 
increase our confidence to theoretical claims that mindreading and metacognition are under 
the umbrella of the same metarepresentational faculty (Carruthers, 2009; Leslie, 1987; 
Moore & Frye, 1991).  
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Nonetheless, it could be argued that these were just spurious correlations, given 
that all the other correlation analyses we conducted in order to examine this relation 
produced non-significant results. Before strong conclusion can be drawn, we should take 
into account that we did find a significant association, when we measured mindreading 
abilities using the MASC. Compared with other mindreading tasks, this is considered a 
quite sensitive measure that taps many aspects of mindreading and not only emotion 
recognition, such as the RMIE (Turner & Felisberti, 2017). Moreover, we should take into 
account that lack of statistical power in our sample could provide a plausible explanation 
for the non-significant results (see pp. 75-76 of the current project for statistical power 
considerations).  
 In Experiment 3.1, we also found that the association between autism traits and 
accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty was non-significant. Nonetheless, this 
is in keeping with results from Experiment 2.1 and with previous research findings 
(Williams et al., 2016), suggesting that the ability to impute mental states to one’s own self 
is unrelated to autism traits. In Experiment 3.2, we examined whether this applies to 
individuals diagnosed with ASD. 
Results from Experiment 3.2 were in absolute contrast with our predictions. 
Despite showing diminished mindreading abilities, individuals with ASD nonetheless 
showed undiminished accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty. This provides a 
significant challenge to “one-system theory” and is more consistent with theoretical claims 
that mindreading and metacognition rely on different mechanisms (Goldman, 2006; 
Nichols & Stich, 2003). Nevertheless, we should note that replication awaits before strong 
conclusions can be drawn. 
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General Conclusion 
The current project provides further evidence of intact interoceptive accuracy in 
ASD and challenges theoretical claims that relate the ASD phenotype with deficits in 
interoception (e.g. Brewer et al., 2015; Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). Our findings indicate 
that people with ASD are able to form first order representations of their physiological 
conditions of their body and as such, they can detect precisely their body signals. Even 
though this ability appears to be intact, it does not necessarily mean that is a prerequisite 
for the correct interpretation of those signals. An individual should be able to reflect the 
first order representations of the physiological conditions of their body upon their 
cognition in order to interpret them correctly. In other words, their ability to form 
metarepresentations should be intact and as such, we can argue that metacognition is 
crucial for this process (Nicholson et al., 2018).  
In the current project, we explored four different indices of metacognition. That is 
interoceptive awareness, accuracy of implicit and explicit judgments of confidence, and 
accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty. Not all metacognitive results were in 
the predicted direction indicating atypical metacognitive monitoring abilities among 
individuals with ASD. One thing to note here is that our sample was always small and this 
could plausibly explain why some of our findings provided evidence that was inconsistent 
with our predictions.  
Statistical Power Considerations 
Given that the study of metacognition in ASD is very limited and the existing 
findings conflicting, estimates of effect sizes were difficult to make precisely, and if made 
they would be to a great extent arbitrary. Based on the argument of the “minimally 
interesting value” (Dienes, 2014), we could claim that ideally in the study of ASD studies 
should be powered to find an effect of 0.50 (or, and .25– equivalent to d of 0.50– and 
above). It is questionable whether between-group differences, which are only small in 
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magnitude, could imply clinical significance (Grainger et al., 2014; Nicholson et al., 2018; 
Williams et al., 2016).  
As such, assuming an effect size of 0.50 for the between-group difference in 
cardiac interoceptive awareness and using one-tailed tests, a power analysis using 
G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that a total sample of 102 
participants was required to achieve Cohen’s recommended power of 0.80 (Cohen, 1992). 
When N = 39 statistical power was 0.31, indicating that our sample was underpowered to 
detect a significant between-group difference in cardiac interoceptive awareness. Using the 
same criterion, we can argue that none of our studies of metacognition in ASD was 
sufficiently powered. That is a common limitation in the study of ASD, given the difficulty 
in recruiting and testing participants from the ASD population. Nonetheless, we cannot 
underestimate the implications that arise from the findings of the current project.  
Implications 
In terms of the theoretical implications of the current project, our findings about 
undiminished interoceptive accuracy in ASD increase our confidence in theoretical claims 
that physical and psychological self-awareness are distinct and independent from each 
other (Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Based on this account, it has been argued that although 
individuals with ASD have impaired psychological self-awareness, their physical self-
awareness is intact because their ability to make first order representations of their body 
outward phenotype and its internal functions is undiminished (Lind, 2010; Nicholson et al., 
2018; Uddin, 2011; Williams, 2010). Our results fit also within the major theoretical 
debate between “one-system” and “two-system” theorists.  
In addition to strong evidence that mindreading abilities are diminished among 
individuals with ASD, we found either moderate or tentative evidence to support the 
hypothesis that metacognitive monitoring abilities are diminished in ASD as well. 
Arguably, the current project provides more evidnce in favour of “one-system” over 
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“two-system” theorists, indicating that both mindreading and metacognition are under the 
control of a single metarepresentational faculty. Along with theoretical implications, major 
clinical and educational implications arise too.  
First, results about diminished interoceptive awareness in ASD should be taken into 
account in medical environments. A deficit in the ability of individuals with ASD to think 
about the physiological conditions of their body or to feel themselves feeling them, could 
potentially makes them to ignore or give a wrong interpretation to a body signal that is out 
of the ordinary. If this is the case, the diminished interoceptive awareness in ASD could 
provide an explanation for their “apparent indifference to pain/heat/cold’ (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 50). Arguably, this difficulty in ASD could lead to late 
diagnosis and treatment of serious medical conditions (Frith & Happé, 1999). This is 
important because it has been found that children with ASD present high comorbidity with 
conditions related to pain (Bottos & Chambers, 2006) and that mortality risk is elevated in 
ASD (Bilder et al., 2013). As such, training programs in physiology and health designed 
for individuals with ASD, along with the psychoeducation of medical staff and carers 
could prevent serious delays in identifying medical conditions among children and adults 
with ASD.  
Second, results about diminished implicit metacognitive monitoring abilities in 
ASD should be taken into account in educational environments. This is crucial given that 
metacognitive monitoring predicts educational achievement independent of IQ and has a 
unique relation with mathematics learning (Ashburner, Ziviani, & Rodger, 2010; 
Pishghadam & Khajavy, 2013; Thiede, 1999; Veenman et al., 2005; Veenman & Spaana, 
2005). As such, deficits in this domain can provide an explanation for the academic 
underachievement that characterise children with ASD and is unrelated to their intellectual 
abilities (Estes, Rivera, Bryan, Cali, & Dawson, 2011). Research has already established a 
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direct link between research evidence about deficits in metacognitive monitoring abilities 
in educational settings and positive outcomes after training.  
Bronsan et al. (2016) found that metacognitive deficits were prominent in students 
with ASD when assessed their performance in mathematics. Specifically, they 
overestimated their performance and they showed lack of cohesion in their intentions 
before answering each mathematic question and after knowing whether they made it right 
or wrong. Based on these findings, Maras, Gamble and Brosnan (2017) designed and 
employed a computer-based programme in metacognitive support among children with 
ASD and neurotypical children. Results indicated that children with ASD who received 
metacognitive support showed increased performance in mathematics, compared to 
children with ASD group who completed the programme without receiving support. 
As such, the design of interventions to support metacognitive monitoring abilities 
and train individuals to metacognitive strategies is of major importance for the alleviation 
of difficulties in areas that students with ASD struggle, such as mathematics (Mayes & 
Calhoun, 2006) and reading comprehension (Minshew et al. 1994; Nation, Clarke, Wright, 
& Williams, 2006; O’Connor & Klein 2004), given that achievement in school is an early 
indicator of a successful career in the future (Kell, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2013).  
Directions for Future Research 
In sum, the findings of the current project provide strong evidence that lower order 
phenomena of self-awareness are intact in ASD and some evidence that higher order 
phenomena of self-awareness are impaired. Nonetheless, due to the novelty of the tasks we 
used and the small sample sizes of the current project, replication of our findings awaits 
before firm conclusion can be drawn. 
 Future research might usefully replicate Experiment 2.2 employing both the 
implicit and the explicit JoC tasks among children with ASD and neurotypical children. To 
our knowledge, evidence about compensation in mindreading have been found only among 
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adults with ASD (Senju et al., 2009). Arguably, children with ASD are less prone to make 
use of compensatory strategies and as such, results will be possible more informative about 
metacognitive monitoring abilities in ASD. In addition, if children with ASD showed 
diminished performance in both JoC tasks, then our confidence in the compensation 
hypothesis would be increased. Overall, despite being in its infancy, we can argue that the 
study of self-awareness appears to be promising when it comes to the understanding of 
many of the unexplained aspects of Autism Spectrum Disorder.  
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Footnotes 
 1 Six participants scored below seven on ADOS, which is the ASD cut-off point 
based on Lord et al.’s criteria (1989). However, three of them were females who scored 
well above the cut-off on the Autism Quotient (AQ; ≥ 26) and based on recent findings 
about diagnostic bias against females, they were not excluded from the analyses reported 
below (Mandy & Lai, 2017; Mussey, Ginn, & Klinger, 2017). The rest (three males) also 
remained in the sample because results did not change substantially, when excluded.1 Four 
participants with ASD scored below the AQ cut-off score, but all of them scored above the 
ASD cut-off on ADOS and therefore were not excluded from the analyses. All TD 
participants scored below the AQ cut-off score. Results from the main analyses of 
Experiment 1 did not change substantially when we excluded male participants with ASD 
who scored below the cut-off score on ADOS (n = 3). An independent sample t-test 
revealed no significant between-group differences in interoceptive accuracy, either in 
cardiac, t(37) = -0.05, p = .96, d = 0.02, BF10 = 0.31, or in respiratory domain, t(37) = -
0.06, p = .95, d = 0.02, BF10 = 0.31. In addition, an independent sample t-t st showed no 
significant between-group differences in interoceptive awareness, either in cardiac, t(34) = 
-1.27, p = .21, d = 0.42, BF10 = 0.60, or in respiratory domain, t(28) = -0.49, p = .63, d = 
0.18, BF10 = 0.38. A series of one-sample t-tests showed that the mean coefficient for both 
cardiac and respiratory interoceptive awareness was significant at chance level in the ASD 
group, t(17) = 0.20, p = .85, d = 0.05, BF10 = 0.25 and t(11) = 1.34, p = .21, d = 0.39, BF10 
= 0.59 respectively.   
 2 Initially, it was designed all participants to start the task having their heartrate 
elevated. Before the administration of the task, we would measure participants’ resting 
heartrate, and then we would ask them to climb some stairs in order to elevate their 
heartrate to a maximum of 90 beats per minute. Once their heartrate was elevated, they 
would start the task. This procedure was designed to be followed for all participants who 
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did not have heart conditions. However, after we employed it upon 8 participants with 
ASD and 9 comparisons, it was evident this this would not serve the purposes of the initial 
design, as participant heartrate dropped to the baseline faster than we expected. Thus, 
following Professor Williams’s indications we omitted this procedure for the rest of our 
sample.  
 3 Participants competed a self-reference task, the awareness subscale of the Body 
Perception Questionnaire (Porges, 1993), the ToM clips of the animations task (Abell et 
al., 2000) as part of a wider project entitled “Metacognition and mindreading: One system 
or two?”, with principal investigator Professor David Williams. In addition, participants 
completed two metacognitive tasks, and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez 
et al., 2002) as part of a PhD project. These measurements were not central for the 
purposes of the current experiment and thus they were not included in the analyses.  
4 In addition, participants competed the TAS-20 (Bagby et al., 1994), as part of  the 
wider project “Metacognition and mindreading: One system or two?”, but as it was not 
central for the purposes of the current project we did not included it in the analyses. 
5 Results from the main analyses of Experiment 2.2 did not change substantially 
when we excluded participants with ASD who scored below the cut-off score on ADOS (n 
= 4). An independent sample t-test revealed that participants with ASD showed 
significantly lower gamma scores in the implicit version of the gambling task compared to 
neurotypical participants, t(40) = -1.94, p = .03, d = 0.59, BF10 = 2.53 (one-tailed). 
Nonetheless, there were no significant between-group differences in gamma scores in the 
explicit version of the gambling task, t(40) = -0.31, p = .38, d = 0.10, BF10 = 0.38 (one-
tailed). 
6 In addition, participants completed the Meta-cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; 
Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004), the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004) and the 20 Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 
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1994), as part of the wider project “Metacognition and mindreading: One system or two?”. 
These measurements were not central for the purposes of the current experiment and thus 
they were not included in the analyses. 
7 Both Experiment 1.1 and Experiment 3.2 include the same sample. Participants 
completed all the tasks described in the method section of each experiment in one testing 
session. However, data was analysed separately for each of these experiments.  
8 Results from the main analysis of Experiment 3.2 did not change substantially 
when we excluded all male participants with ASD who scored below the cut-off score on 
ADOS (n = 2). An independent sample t-test revealed no significant between-group 
differences in accuracy of metacognitive experiences of difficulty, t(36) = 0.53, p = .30, d 
= 0.17, BF10 = 0.23 (one-tailed). 
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Appendix A 
Experiment 4.1: Individual Differences  
The self-reference effect (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) was also explored to 
enhance our understanding of lower order phenomena of self-awareness in ASD. That is 
the phenomenon whereby information related to ones’ own self is encoded more deeply to 
information related to other people. This explains why individuals show superior memory 
and accurate perceptual judgments for information related to themselves over information 
related to others (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012; Symons & Johnson, 1997; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Given that in a recently published study, it was found that individuals 
with ASD show the typical self-reference effect in perception, providing evidence that 
lower order phenomena of self-awareness are intact in ASD (Williams et al., 2018b), we 
aimed to further examine this phenomenon. Sun, Fuentes, Humphreys and Sui (2016) 
found that the self-referent effect in perception was enhanced when stimuli were presented 
in an embodied with individuals perspective. Thus, we initially aimed to replicate these 
findings and examine its relation to autism traits and mindreading abilities in the general 
population and then to explore this effect among individuals with ASD. Nonetheless, our 
findings indicated that the embodied perspective did not enhance the self-reference effect. 
Therefore, we did not precede with employing this task among individuals with ASD. The 
method we followed to replicate Sun et al.’s (2016) study as well as our basic findings are 
both described briefly below.   
Experiment 4.1: Method 
Participants  
Fifty-two undergraduate students (40 female) participated in this study, after they 
had given written, informed consent. Their average age was 19.63 (SD = 2.33; range = 18 
to 30) years. Participants were recruited via the Research Participation Scheme (RPS) of 
the University of Kent, UK and they were offered course credits in partial fulfilment of 
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their degree, as compensation for their participation in the experiment. Ethical approval for 
this study was obtained from the Kent School Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
(Ethics ID: 201815185209334939). 
Materials, Procedures, and Scoring 
As in all the experiments of the current project, participants completed the RMIE 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a), and the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b). In addition, they 
performed the colours task, as described by Sun et al., (2016).  
Colours task.  
Participants first were instructed to associate three different colours (red, blue, and 
green) with three different person labels. These labels related to either themselves (“You”), 
a named best friend (“Friend”), or an unknown person (“Stranger”). Each colour was 
associated with a different person label. The start of each experimental trial was signalled 
with a fixation cross appearing on 22-in computer screen for 500ms. Subsequently, two 
avatars were presented for 300ms, before a person label (“You”, “Friend”, or “Stranger”) 
appeared in between the two avatars for 300ms. One of the avatars was being displayed in 
first-person perspective, having its back to the participant, while the other one was being 
presented in third-person perspective, facing the participant. The target avatar was wearing 
a t-shirt coloured either blue, green, or red, while the other one was wearing a shallow grey 
t-shirt. Following this, a blank screen was presented for a variable time between 800 and 
1200ms. Within this time frame, participants had to respond to whether the contingency 
between the target avatar’s t-shirt colour and the person label matched that learnt in the 
training phase or mismatched, by pressing either the “c” key of a keyboard for a match or 
the “m” key for a mismatch. After each trial, participants received feedback (correct, 
incorrect, or slow) based upon their response (see Figure A1 for a graphical representation 
of the task). Following a minimum of 12 practice trials, each participant performed three 
blocks of 120 experimental trials with the trial order being randomised within blocks. The 
SELF-AWARENESS IN ASD  108   
 
task had six versions, representing each possible t-shirt colour and label combination, so 























Following Sun at al. (2016) we calculated d-prime scores (dʹ), to indicate the 
accuracy with which participants distinguished matches from mismatches for the three 
person labels per each perspective; thus six dʹ scores were calculated for each participant, 
using the formula dʹ = Z(H) – Z(FA). The higher the dʹ score the greater the accuracy. We 




 Figure A1. Graphical representation of the procedure and stimuli used in the colours task 
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perspectives. Matches and mismatches were analysed separately. Thus, six median RTs 
were calculated for each participant.  
Experiment 4.1: Results 
A 2 (perspective: first/ third) × 3 (person label: you/ friend/ stranger) ANOVA was 
conducted on dʹ scores. The analysis revealed only a significant main effect of person, 
F(2,102) = 22.13, p < .001, ��2 = .30, with participants responding more accurately to 
stimuli related to themselves compared to stimuli related to other people. Crucially, neither 
the main effect of Perspective nor the interaction Person Label x Perspective was 
significant (all ps  ≥ .90, all ��S2  ≤ .00), indicating no significant differences in accuracy in 
terms of the perspective. Next, a 2 (perspective: first/ third) × 3 (person label: you/ friend/ 
stranger) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on median RTs for matches. The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of person, indicating that participants responded 
faster to stimuli related to themselves compared to stimuli related to others, F(2,102) = 
34.40, p < .001, ��2 = .44. In addition, contrary to Sun et al.’s (2016) findings, the analysis 
revealed a marginally significant main effect of perspective, indicating relatively faster 
responses to stimuli presented in third perspective, indicating relatively faster responses to 
stimuli presented in third person perspective  responses to stimuli presented in third person 
perspective rather than in first person perspective F(1,51) = 3.46, p < .07, ��2 = .06. 
Nonetheless, the interaction between Person Label x Perspective was non-significant, 
F(2,102) = 0.68, p = .51, ��2 = .01. Finally, a 2 (perspective: first/ third) × 3 (person label: 
you/ friend/ stranger) ANOVA was also conducted on median RTs for mismatches. Even 
though there was a significant Person Label x Perspective interaction, F(2,102) = 13.24, p 
< .001, ��2 = .21,  results from paired sample t-tests were in absolute contrast with Sun et 
al.’s (2016) findings. That is to say, the analysis revealed that participants responded 
significantly faster when the label “Friend” was presented in third person perspective than 
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in first person perspective, t(51) = 8.75, p < .001. All the other t-tests produced non-
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Appendix B 
A one sample t-test indicated that the average RMIE score of our sample (M = 
26.16; SD =4.79) did not differ significantly from the average score of the general 
population (M = 26.20; SD =3.60), reported by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001a), t(55) = -0.06, p 
= .95, BF10 = 0.15. Likewise, the difference between the average AQ score in the current 
experiment (M = 15.75; SD = 6.92) and the average AQ score of the general population (M 
= 16.40; SD = 6.30), as reported by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001b), was not significant t(55) = 
0.70 p = .49, BF10 = 0.19.  
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Appendix C 
A one sample t-test showed that the average AQ score of current sample (M = 
15.71, SD = 6.88) did not differ significantly from the average AQ score of the general 
population (M = 16.40, SD = 6.30), as reported by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001b), t(78) = -
0.89, p = .38, BF10 = 0.18. An one sample t-test also indicated that although the average 
RMIE score across participants (M = 27.37, SD =3.55) was significantly higher compared 
to the average score of the general population (M = 26.20, SD =3.60), t(78) = 2.92, p = 
.005, BF10 = 6.28, it was not significantly higher when compared with student population 
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